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Spanish Communist Party, describing its role during the
Spanish Civil War and its opposition to the autocratic
Franco regime which followed. The study also analyzes the
party's role in the domestic politics of emerging, post-
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porary phenomenon called Eurocommunism. Employing a levels
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concludes that the Spanish Communist Party has, in its very
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1977 the legalization of the Spanish Communist
Party ( Partido Communista Espanol - PCE) was announced. The
public outcry and feared military reaction predicted by many
doomsayers did not materialize. The party went on to parti-
cipate in the June 1977 elections in a manner which, unexpect-
edly to some observers, was highly respectable. The PCE
platform was remarkable in some respects in that on many
points, it actually supported positions to the right of the
platform of the Socialist Workers' Party ( Partido Socialista
Qbrero Espanol - PSOE)
.
The PCE has advocated its platform internationally as
well as domestically with PCE Secretary-General Santiago
Carrillo expounding the virtues of Eurocommunism to the rest
of Europe and the communist world. In this realm, too, PCE
policy has differed in key tenets from the generally expected
communist line. Such differences have led to much publi-
cized criticism of Carrillo by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) . In both of the above instances the
outcome was not entirely unpredictable, given the historical
legacy of the PCE and the somewhat pluralistic form that the
international communist movement has taken in recent years.
Using a levels of analysis model as an organizational
tool, this study will investigate the development of the
PCE. It is hoped that an analysis of the evolution of the

PCE party line in this manner will provide a logical, if
somewhat subjective, means for predicting future PCE policy
actions as the post-Franco government in Spain continues
to develop.
At the first level of analysis lies the party itself.
In order to completely understand the PCE of today, one must
have a knowledge of the historical stigma which the PCE has
acquired as a result of its actions, activities and policies
during the Spanish Civil War. Even today, many perceptions
and misconceptions which the Spanish people have concerning
the PCE are directly attributable to that time and to the
propaganda which PCE opponents, both to the left and to the
right, have generated based on the PCE ' s Civil War activi-
ties. Consequently, many of the PCE ' s present day political
pronouncements and party activities are directed toward
overcoming its historical legacy.
At the second level of analysis lies the Spanish domestic
political environment. Since 1975, the politics of Spain
have undergone a radical transformation from a politically
stifled autocratic regime into a politically lively consti-
tutional monarchy. In this context an investigation of the
PCE's legalization in 1976, its participation in the 1977
elections, and of the results it achieved should prove useful
in determining the actual political strength of the party
and assist in predicting its future actions.

Finally, at the third level of analysis lies the inter-
national communist movement and the PCE ' s activities within
it. Since 1968 the PCE has developed into a highly indepen-
dent communist party, espousing not only its own anti-CPSU
views, but also proposing a West European brand of socialism
called Eurocommunism as an alternative to the Soviet model.
The rapidly growing acceptance of Eurocommunist ideals in
recent years has caused great concern not only in the
Kremlin, but also in Western diplomatic circles. Consequently,
an investigation of the PCE today cannot disregard the inno-
vative activities of the PCE in attempting to become the
leader of this trend. In this light a sufficiently detailed
discussion of the evolution of Eurocommunism will be presented
to provide an additional perspective from which to view the
continuing development of the PCE.

II. THE PCE PAST
A. THE EARLY YEARS
The PCE, like most Spanish institutions, is a peculiarly
Iberian phenomenon which must be analyzed first by looking
at its historical heritage. The PCE grew out of the active
reform movement of industrializing Spain of the 1800' s.
However, the strength of the anarchist movement and the
Socialists served to constrain the growth potential of the
party until the events of the Civil War brought the PCE to
the forefront of Spanish Republican politics.
The anarchist movement of Bakunin took deep hold among
workers in Catalonia and peasant farmers of Andalusia during
the 1860's and early 1870 's. After the death of Bakunin and
the dissolution of the First International in 1876, the
anarchist movement in the rest of Europe was leaderless,
in accordance with the movement's own philosophical position,
and it became generally ineffectual politically. However,
during the same time, foreign concepts of labor organization
transformed the Spanish anarchist movement into a unique
anarcho-syndicalist form which manifested itself in the
Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) formed in 1910. "The
anarcho-syndicalists believed in organizing the workers
into syndicates or labor unions capable of industrial strikes,
for they saw the strike as the prime weapon to achieve
social revolution. Their ultimate objective was the general
10

strike that would paralyze the economy, forcing concessions
and eventually bringing about the overthrow of the state."
A second revolutionary doctrine which grew out of the
First International was Marxism. Just as in the rest of
Europe, the ideas of Marx had a great impact on the labor
movement in Spain. Receiving inspiration from the organi-
zational and administrative abilities of Pablo Iglesias,
its Spanish founder, the PSOE, established in 1879, worked
through its trade union arm, the Union General de
Trabajadores (UGT) to win over Spanish workers from anarchism.
Unable to penetrate the anarchist stronghold of Catalonia,
the PSOE extended its appeal for support throughout the
rest of Spain so that by 1910 the PSOE had achieved great
influence over a large sector of Spanish thinkers and workers.
Thus, during the time of the Second International and
through the First World War, the Spanish labor movement was
divided between the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists who
believed in violent, direct action and no compromise with
the employer class, and the Socialists who strove for limited
gains and evolution toward socialism through legislation.
The split was also geographic; CNT strength lay in Catalonia,
and Andalusia while the UGT was largely composed of Castilian
peasants and craftsmen and northern miners and industrial
Richard Herr, Spain
,
(Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1971) , p. 129.
11

workers. The two organizations rarely cooperated, por-
tending a characteristic of the Spanish labor movement
2
which was an inherent cause of the Spanish Civil War.
Although the Russian revolution of 1917 was greatly
admired by Spanish proletarian leaders, few of them became
communists. Therefore, while the French and Italian
Socialist parties voted to join the Third International,
3the PSOE rejected it. The PCE was first proclaimed on 19
December 1919 by a dissident wing of the PSOE, the Federacion
de Juventudes Socialistas, as a result of the PSOE ' s refusal
4to adhere to the Third International. A second split
occurred in July of 1920 when the PSOE, after reversing its
original position and sending a delegation to the Internatinal
after all, refused to accept the "Twenty-one Conditions for
Admission" . In this instance the Partido Comunista Obrero
Espanol (PCOE) splintered off to establish ties with the
Comintern and by November 19 21 had joined with the PCE.
Also in 1920, the CNT had voted against affiliation with
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Maurin, left to join the PCE. By 1921 the PCE numbered
only approximately 1200 members and was dominated by the
7two larger parties of the left.
The rightist dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera,
established in September of 1923, promised to end the threat
of labor strife. He established twenty-seven corporations
for various industries and professions (similar to Mussolini's
model of the corporate state) which had sole authority to
negotiate labor agreements. Since the anarchists refused
to cooperate with these organs of the state, the CNT was
outlawed and driven underground where its more militant
members formed the Federacion Anarchista Iberica (FAI) , soon
to become the vanguard of radical, violent anarchism in
gSpain. Upon the issue of cooperation with the government
syndicates, the Socialists were split. One faction under
Indelicio Prieto did not accept the regime's plan. Another,
more radical faction under Francisco Largo Caballero saw
cooperation as a possible means to destroy the anarchist
opposition, a move which earned him great enmity among the
i








The dictatorship initially tolerated the PCE but even-
tually banned the party in December 1924. Subsequent
government repression and internal dissension quickly shrank
party membership to approximately 500 members. The party
remained insignificant in size, able to increase its member-
ship to only about 800 members by the beginning of the
Second Republic in 1931.
In 1931 the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera fell, as
did the monarchy when King Alphonso XIII entered exile in
disgrace in April. The Provisional Government of the
Second Republic under Niceto Alcala Zamora, composed of
Republicans and Socialists was given the reins of government.
It called elections for the coming June. In these elections
the government coalition won the majority of seats in the
one-house Cortes of the Republic while numerous other groupings
on the left and right also gained seats. In these elections
the PCE polled only 4% of the vote and gained no seats in
12the Cortes. All in all, the seven years of the Primo de
Rivera dictatorship and the first year of the Republic can
be said to have led to the eclipse of the Communists as an








right and the anarchists on their left emerged strengthened
from this phase.
Apparently the Comintern saw in the unsettled conditions
of Spain a revolutionary situation similar to Russia in
pre-revolutionary days. Comintern advisers were sent to
Spain to reorganize the party, at this time led by Jose
Diaz, for an attempt to gain control of the proletarian
movement there. Objection to increased association with
Moscow views caused Spanish Communist leaders Nin and Maurin
to split from the PCE in 1932 to form their own rival parties.
Subsequently, the two joined forces to form the Partido Obrero
14de Unificacion Marxista (POUM) . The anti-Stalmist POUM
was a uniquely Catalan entity which soon came into conflict
with the PCE as both parties strove for leadership of the
Spanish communist movement.
During the years 1932 to 1934, the PCE, conforming
closely to Comintern instructions, refused to cooperate with
the Republican government which it considered bourgeois or
with other revolutionary groups. Despite continued internal
disaffections and tactical blunders, attributed largely to
Comintern advice and instructions, the PCE slowly added to
13 Ibid., p. 19.
14 Sworakowski, p. 397
15

its membership. By 1933 it had doubled its voting strength
and had elected one deputy to the Cortes.
Due to factionalization and inter-party conflict, the
left was defeated in the 1933 elections. A coalition of
Catholic parties, the Confederacion Espanola de Derechas
Autonomas (CEDA) , under the leadership of Jose Maria Gil
Robles became the majority party of the Cortes although
political maneuvering by the left prevented Gil Robles from
being named Prime Minister.
The left's loss of influence as a result of the 1933
elections provided the Communists with the opportunity to
test their nascent popular front strategy. Cattell pro-
vides a concise background for the reasoning behind the
PCE ' s urging of the Popular Front which emerged in Spain in
1934:
The Soviet Union's entrance into the League
of Nations in 19 34 marked a sharp change of
the Communist's interpretation of their
Hermet, p. 21.
I r
In this study, the term "popular front tactic" will
be used to denote the Communist strategy of proposing politi-
cal alliances with Socialists and other leftist parties for
the purpose of attaining greater influence in domestic
politics. Once achieved, the coalition becomes formally
expressed in a "Popular Front", as it was termed in France
in 1934 and Spain in 1936. Subsequently, the Communists
attempt to infiltrate the ranks of their alliance partners
to gain operational control of the coalition. Although in
later years, such coalitions were variously termed, "United
Fronts", "National Fronts", or other similar designations,
"Popular Front" will be used generically in this study to
describe all such coalitions.
16

relationship to other countries. Before 1934
the Soviet Union had viewed the world generally
as split into two hostile camps — the
Communists and the non-Communists. In 1934
this policy was revised providing for the
temporary alliance of all anti-Fascists against
fascism. This revised interpretation found
its reflection not only in a change in Russian
foreign policy, but in the program of the
Communist International. The Seventh Congress
of the Comintern in 1935 defined this new
policy of the United Front. The Spanish
conflict, beginning in July 1936, was the
first real opportunity for the Comintern to
put the United Front into practical operation. *-7
Actually, the PCE acted to institute a popular front
before its official proclamation by the Comintern by pro-
posing, in 1934, joint action with the PSOE. The PCE
overtures were rejected, however, another of the frequent
miners' uprisings in Asturias in late 1934 vividly demonstrated
the value of concerted, unified action as proposed by PCE.
The uprising was part of a general strike called by the
Socialists in three areas, Barcelona, Madrid, and Asturias.
The CNT refusal to participate doomed the effort in Barcelona;
army strength doomed the effort in Madrid; only in Asturias,
where the CNT, the UGT and the Communists had united, did
the effort reach any level of success. The violence of the
uprising, although opposed by most of its leaders frightened
the beleaguered rightist government into calling in Spanish
Foreign Legion elements to reinforce outnumbered government
T_7
David Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War ,




troops. Under the orders of their commander, General
Francisco Franco, the government forces ruthlessly crushed
1
8
the rebellion and executed an estimated two thousand miners.
This was not the only time that the left would experience
the ruthless determination of young General Franco.
Nonetheless, the lesson of the advantages to be gained
by unity of action were not lost on the left, at least for
the time being. By January of 1936 a Popular Front Pact
was signed in which the Republican Left, the Republican
Union and the Catalan Left parties aligned with the PSOE
and the PCE in a communist-espoused program demanding a
return to the religious, educational and regional policies
of the first two years of the Republic, land reform and
19
amnesty for political prisoners.
The Popular Front platform proposed by the Communists
was a marvel of political ambiguity in that it had something
for everyone and nothing that could be construed as critical
of any leftist faction. Cattell enumerates the Pact's
four main points:
1. Confiscation of the land from the Grandees,
Church and convents without compensation
and its immediate distribution to individual
peasants and farm workers.
2. Liberation of the oppressed peoples from
Spanish imperialism, giving autonomy to
Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia.
18Benjamin Welles, Spain: The Gentle Anarchy , (NY:




3. Improvement in the conditions of life
and work of the laborers.
4. Amnesty for all revolutionary and
political prisoners. 20
Notably, the program could appeal to Catholic Basque Repub-
licans and peasants desiring land as well as Anarchists
demanding amnesty for prisoners, without raising the alarms
of the usual communist demands for destruction of the bourgeois
21
state, collectivization or nationalization.
The program produced electoral victory for the left
which regained power in 1936 with 267 seats in the Cortes
and also victory for the PCE which was allotted 16 of those
22 . ...
seats. Moreover, the Communists used their improving
image to take advantage of the general arousal of political
activity to entice recruits to the party. By the outbreak
of the Civil War the PCE claimed 117,000 members (although,
2350,000 is probably a more accurate figure).
The success of the Popular Front added greatly to the
influence of the PCE on the Socialists. Previous to 1934
the Communists and the Socialists had been the most bitter
of enemies. However, after the Popular Front success and







to play upon the joint Communist/Socialist heritage of
Marxism to gain a closer association with and cooperation
from the Socialists. Additionally, the Socialist rivalry
with the anarchists induced the Socialists to increasingly
accept the assistance of the growing Communist party as a
24
way to oppose anarchist political advances. An example
of the growing Communist/Socialist alliance was the unifi-
cation of the Communist and Socialist youth groups in March
of 1936. Even though the Communist group numbered only 50,000
to the Socialists 1 200,000, the resulting Juventudes Socialistas
Unificadas (JSU) was controlled by the Communists from the
. 25beginning.
Probably the most important outgrowth of the Popular
Front was the great influence the Communists gained over the
political outlook of Francisco Largo Caballero, the ram-
bunctious leader of the large militant section of the PSOE.
By praising him as the "Spanish Lenin", the Communists were
able to employ Caballero' s great revolutionary zeal and
influence in the PSOE to their own ends. The Communists
also benefitted greatly in this respect from the favor which
they held with Julio Alvarez de Vayo, Caballero 's right-hand
man. Some authorities have claimed that Alvarez de Vayo was










proven. Nonetheless, he was extremely favorably disposed
to Communist political desires. In these ways, the Communists
later gained leverage in the running of Republican affairs
during the war quite out of proportion to their actual
numbers in the government.
The Popular Front government was never really able to
exercise the power demonstrated in its election victory.
The next five months showed a progressive weakening of the
government's ability to control the rapidly deteriorating
situation. In the countryside land seizures and the burning
of landholders' homes become everyday occurances while in
the cities assassinations and gang warfare went on almost
continually. Meanwhile, Largo Caballero's speeches demanding
the immediate inauguration of socialism, calling for a
collectivist Utopia, and demanding a government of peasants
and workers spread alarm among the right and even among
moderate elements. On 19 July 1936 a junta of generals,
which included General Franco, led the army in a revolt
against the Republic.
Many have tried to justify the July Generals' Revolt as
a rightist reaction to a communist plot to seize the govern-
ment and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Given







with the POUM, the justification does not seem to be ade-
quate. Others have characterized the uprising of the
generals as a Fascist plot. Evidence does not convincingly
support this explanation, either. Rather, the uprising was
an internal political phenomenon resulting from the collapse
of the political center. The right, realizing that moderate
Republicans were losing out and that leftist reforms would
be swift and wide-ranging, acted to sabotage the institution
27
of those reforms in the only way remaining, physical revolt.
B. THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR
Probably the greatest single factor affecting the PCE '
s
image today is the legacy of its activities (real or imagined)
during the Spanish Civil War. To some the war provided the
Communists with their finest hour for it was in large part
due to PCE dedication and organizational ability that the
Republic withstood the early siege of Madrid, enabling the
Republic to fend off the Nationalist onslaught for nearly
three more years. To others the war was a Communist con-
spiracy to achieve socialist revolution through violence,
and it is true that the PCE did take advantage of the disrup-
tion to purge and destroy their enemies. To still others
the PCE was merely the agent of an alien power, working
solely to make way for a foreign take-over of the government







When the Republican government found itself powerless
due to the scope of the revolt, it turned to its only ally -
the working masses. Immediately, workers' militias developed
along trade union lines. They were armed with weapons dis-
tributed by the government and with weapons brought forth
from hidden arsenals of the various political factions. For
the moment political infighting stopped and cooperation
between the various parties became the order of the day.
By November 1936 the Nationalist armies, having gained
control of the north and south with little opposition, had
reached the outskirts of Madrid. They expected it to fall
easily, signaling the death of the Republic. That Madrid
did not fall was due to the valiant efforts of the various
Republican militia units, led by the example of the Communist
Fifth Regiment and backed by the just arrived International
Brigades which had been organized with Comintern backing
and were equipped with Russian arms. On 6 November the
recently installed Largo Caballero government, which included
Communists Vincente Uribe and Jesus Hernandez along with
Communist sympathizer, Juan Negrin , fled to Valencia,
leaving Madrid in the hands of a Junta of Defense controlled
by the PCE. Roused by the stirring rhetoric of the charis-
matic Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria", the Madrid militias




The PCE quickly parlayed the prestige it received for the
inspiring defense of Madrid and its control of military aid
from the Soviet Union (which had begun in October) to
greatly enhance its power in the Republican government.
By early 1937 the PCE began taking advantage of its
position to eliminate opposition Republican elements. One
of its first targets was the Republican army. Richard
Herr describes how the Communists moved to accomplish the
task:
To gain control of the army they used the
mechanism of political commissars, insti-
tuted by the government in October 1936 on
the model of those of the Red Army in
Russia. They were assigned to military
units to instruct the soldiers in political
doctrine and to be right-hand men, and
watchdogs, of the commanding officers.
Not by accident most of the commissars
were Communists, and their association with
the party and thus with the source of supplies
gave them such authority that frequently they
rivaled the generals. 29
Nevertheless, as David Cattell points out, the Communists
were the backbone of the Republican army. "...all observers
agree that out of the general chaos the government, driven
by the Communists, created a modern army capable of with-
standing for three years the combined forces of Franco, the
Moroccan Legions, the Spanish Foreign Legion, several
Italian divisions, and sections of the German Army. It would
be quite true to say that without the Communists as the
29 Ibid., p. 204.
24

unifying and driving factor, the Loyalist forces would have
been defeated long before 1939.
"
30
The PCE was also moving in other ways to eliminate its
political rivals. Early in the war the PCE had engineered
the unification of Communist and Socialist elements in
Catalonia under the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya
(PSUC) which it soon controlled. Then, in May 1937, the
PCE moved to rid itself of its mortal enemy, the POUM. On
3 May CNT elements holding the telephone exchange in Barcelona
resisted with gunfire the attempts by government police to
relieve them. In the ensuing gun battle the anarchists
were supported by the POUMists. The insurrection was quickly
quelled, but the PCE demanded severe punishment of the
"uncontrollables" , meaning the POUM. However, Largo Caballero
refused to punish any group that had fought the enemies of
the Republic, whereupon the Communist ministers of the
cabinet resigned. Unable to form a new government, Largo
Caballero himself resigned and Juan Negrin was named Prime
Minister. During subsequent weeks, over one thousand
POUMists were arrested, many of whom were assassinated or
deported to the Soviet Union to an unknown fate . POUM
32leader Andres Nin was one who was killed. George Orwell,
30Cattell, p. 82.
31 Ibid., p. 205.
32 Sworakowski, p. 398
25

33in his book Homage to Catalonia
,
presents a vivid account
of the events of those days and POUM feelings which they
evinced. Having used the revolutionary zeal of Largo
Caballero to gain the needed support of middle-class Repub-
lican Socialists to counter the influence of the extreme
left anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, and then to
eliminate the hated POUM, the PCE had cast aside the "Spanish
Lenin" and changed their support to the more easily con-
34trolled Juan Negrin.
Due to the presence of the UGT and CNT, the PCE had
never had a large following among Spanish workers. There-
fore, as the war progressed, the PCE continued to seek broad
support among Republican middle-class elements. Consequently,
by 19 38 the party had a large membership element of bourgeois
and rural' background holding moderate views.
One reason for the Communist success on this tack was
the policies of the extreme left CNT, which espoused take-
over and collectivization of all small businesses. As
small businessmen lost their savings and property through
confiscation, they looked for help in order to salvage
something from the ruins of the old system. The Communists
provided hope in their defense of middle class interests.
33George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia
,
(NY: Harcourt, 1952






In return, the middle class lent its support to the
Communists
.
A second reason is that the better organized Communists
provided something stable to lean upon in the turbulent
Republican sector. Cattell relates an example of this
feeling:
It often happened that, when I came
across a man who was just leaving for
the front, I asked him:
"But why did you join the Communist
Party? You were never a Communist, were
you? You were always a Republican."
"I joined the Communists because they
are disciplined and they do their job
better than anybody else." was the
answer. 36
A third element of the Communist's past which still
haunts them is that, of all the factions vying for power in
Republican Spain, the Communists were the only ones who were
considered the agents of an alien power. Although the
Germans and the Italians also provided extensive aid and
advice to Franco's Rebel forces, the Communists have received
a very bad press during the ensuing post-Civil War years
because of the participation of Soviet agents on the Republican
side.
The corps of Soviet "advisers" played an important role
in the increasing influence of the Communists in the
Republican government. A political group, nominally under
16 *
Cattell, p. 95, quoting Jose Martin Blasquez, I_
Helped Build an Army, p. 205.
27

Marcel Rosenburg, the Soviet Ambassador to Spain, worked to
gain influence among elements within the government. A
second group under General Berzin worked to control critical
elements of the army and Defense Ministry. This second
group was so successful that at times they seemed to have
direct control over military operations. It often appeared
that overall strategy came from the Comintern itself. The
final group was the GPU, the Soviet secret police, which
worked to rid the Republican side of Fascist agents and
37
"uncontrollables" . The extent that these "advisers"
actually controlled Republican policy can be attributed to
the importance of Soviet military aid to the beleaguered
Republican side.
Cattell points out that accurate figures concerning
actual Soviet military aid to the Republic are probably
impossible to find. However, he does cite statistics
extrapolated from Nationalist figures on captured arms (which
compare favorably with other sources) to indicate that the
Soviet Union supplied nearly 100% of the tanks, 50% of the
machine guns, 60% of the rifles and 15% of the larger artillery
38
used by the Republican forces. He also states that, due







drove most of the tanks and Russian pilots flew nearly all
39
of the aircraft of the meager Republican Air Force.
Non-intervention (and therefore non-support) by Britain
and France left the Republicans in desperate need of mili-
tary supplies. Indeed, without Soviet military aid and
Communist organizational ability, the Republicans would
quickly have succumbed to the overwhelming strength of the
Nationalists. Consequently, Soviet military aid provided
the Communists with a very useful lever to exert control
over events in Republican Spain. The strength of this lever
was further enhanced by the fact that Soviet-supplied war
material did not leave Soviet control once it entered Spain.
Instead, it was stored in Soviet or Communist-controlled
depots from which it was doled out as the Soviet advisers
saw fit.
Another form of Soviet aid to the Republic was the
International Brigades, units of volunteers of all types
and ideologies recruited internationally by foreign communist
parties. The reasons for the organization of these units
were several: the Soviet Union realized the need for well-
trained foreign troops to bolster the "undisciplined"
Republican militias against the Italian- and German-backed
Nationalist forces; Soviet arms could be better secured in





assignment of as many of the numerous volunteers to the
Republican cause as possible would be assured. Among the
many organizers of this Comintern project who were to later
gain greater renown were Palmiro Togliatti, Luigi Longo and
40 . .Joseph Eroz Tito. From the initial units which contributed
significantly to the early defense of Madrid, the International
Brigades grew to 40,000 to 50,000 members. They were a
central element in most of the major battles which followed,
41
and they suffered extremely heavy casualties. Ultimately,
however, with the tide of the war going definitely against
the Republicans and under the guise of a Non-intervention
Committee plan to remove foreign volunteers from both sides,
the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of the Brigades,
42
and by the end of November 1938 they were gone.
Another incident which has been a blackmark against the
Communist image was the transfer of the Spanish gold reserves
to the Soviet Union. Due in part to the Soviet Union demanding
payment in gold for arms shipped to Spain, and in part to the
vulnerability of the reserves demonstrated by the seige of
Madrid in the early portion of the war, the Republican
government shipped approximately one-half of the Spanish
gold reserves, worth about $57 8 million, to the Soviet Union.






42Vincent Brome, The International Brigades , (NY:
William Morrow, 1966), p. 365.
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The initial suggestion to make the shipment apparently
came from the Russian trade envoy named Stashevsky. The
gold has yet to be returned, and to this day the element
of conspiracy in the transaction has been attributed to a
43Communist plot.
The Communists, under pressure from the Comintern, were
also responsible for the prolongation of the war long after
it became readily apparent that the Republican cause was
lost. In late 1937 the Nationalists had conquered the
Republican northern provinces of Asturias and Euzkadi and
had consolidated their hold on Aragon from Teruel through
Zaragossa to the French border. The Republicans recovered
slightly, successfully retaking Teruel in January 1938.
But they then suffered a series of disastrous and debili-
tating defeats. By the end of March, the Nationalists had
regained Teruel and pushed a salient deep into Republican
territory along the Ebro River in Catalonia. President
Negrin, with strong Communist backing, was determined to
continue the war. Meanwhile, Indelicio Prieto, Socialist
Minister of Defense and staunch opponent of the Communists,
had sent out feelers to Franco for a negotiated settlement.
However, the Communists' die-hard measures and fanatically
uncompromising positions were ultimately to extend the
suffering and death for many more months.
43Burnett Bolletin, The Grand Camouflage , (NY: Praeger,
1961) , p. 123.
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Communist attacks soon discredited Prieto, and Negrin
replaced him by forming a new cabinet in which Negrin took
the Defense portfolio for himself. The Communists then
began to reassert control over the army, a process that
Prieto had stymied for a time. Communist seizure of power
in the Republic seemed to be imminent.
However/ the military situation effectively deterred
them from such action. By November the last of the Inter-
national Brigades had been withdrawn. Soviet military aid
had already slowed to a trickle and the French and British
submission to Hitler at Munich in September banished all
hope of their intervention to aid the Republic. In January
of 1939 Nationalist troops occupied Barcelona with little
military opposition.
Negrin, having escaped to France, returned to Valencia
to continue the resistance. At Communist insistence he
began replacing "defeatist", non-Communist commanders with
Communists. The non-Communist officers, led by Colonel
Casado, revolted against this policy, sending Negrin and the
government fleeing to Algiers. A counter-revolt by the
Communists was defeated, but the internecine struggle had
seriously weakened the Republican forces. Subsequently,
a Nationalist offensive on Madrid, now the last Republican
stronghold, quickly overcame the beleaguered Republicans.






Looking back to the Civil War, it is possible to
discern three factors which have significantly influenced
the policies of the PCE today. The first is the obvious
fact that the popular front tactic did bring the Communists
to power. It is quite likely that the Communists would
have held highly influential, if not controlling, positions
in the Spanish government had the Republican side prevailed
in the Civil War. The present PCE "Pact for Liberty"
(which will be described below) can be seen as a direct
outgrowth of this Communist "success" in Republican Spain.
Secondly, the Franco regime's incessant anti-communist
propaganda continually misconstrued actual facts and played
upon popular misconceptions surrounding the PCE ' s activities
during the Civil War. Consequently, the PCE ' s poor reputa-
tion was kept prominently before the Spanish public until
Franco's death in 1975. Therefore, the PCE has taken great
pains, especially in recent years, to present a public image
of utmost honesty, decorum and moderation.
Finally, the stigma of Soviet control has remained with
the PCE throughout the years. That the PCE, through its
present leader, Santiago Carrillo, is today probably the
most vocal anti-Soviet communist organization in the world
is to a great degree attributable to the Spanish Communists'
need to rid themselves of this skeleton in their closet.
However, the PCE ' s present position has not been easily
achieved. The long years of Franco suppression and the need
33

to look to Moscow for moral and monetary support made the
years of exile extremely difficult.
The following section is, therefore, dedicated to
describing the major events of the PCE exile and underground
existence from 1939 until the party's legalization in 1977.
G. THE YEARS OF EXILE
Apart from the first few months of its
existence, the Communist Party of Spain
enjoyed only eight years of legality, from
1931 to 1939. During that time it experi-
enced its 'finest hour', when it was the
world's only Communist Party, apart from
the Soviet Communist Party, to have a
share in the government. Throughout the
remainder of its history, it has had to
function underground. 4 5
The legal existence of the PCE came to an end on 6 March
1939 when most senior leaders of the party, including
Dolores Ibarruri, and members of the Negrin government
departed Valencia airport. Other party members, including
Santiago Carrillo, did not leave Madrid until 28 March, in
the waning hours of the war. Many local Communists remained
in Spain to face as best they could the oncoming Franco
46
repression.
Until the end of World War II the PCE was to remain dis-
persed, fragmented and ostracized. The exiles first went






Prats de Mollo, Barcares, St. Cyprien, Gurs and Argeles-
sur-Mer. The poor conditions of these camps and the dis-
crimination inflicted upon the exiles is vividly described
47by Palencia in Smouldering Freedom . Some seventy thousand
48Republican refugees died in these camps from 1939 to 1942.
Separation and wartime hardship prevented any effective
anti-Franco opposition being mounted from this area. Even-
tually, most of the PCE leadership moved to the Soviet Union
where they joined several hundred Spanish Communists who had
earlier left Spain. However, the vast majority of rank-
and-file Communist refugees stayed behind in those French
49
camps of sad memory.
In the Soviet Union the approximately 3500 Spanish
refugees were forceably separated among several towns sur-
rounding Moscow: Planiernaya, Senios, Monino and Zanki.
The hardships of the refugees in the USSR is recounted by
Comin Comer in his book La republica en exilio . . In this
location, too, wartime conditions and the great distance
separating the Spanish Communists in exile from events in
Spain prevented any effective opposition organization from
developing.
47 Isabel de Palencia, Smouldering Freedom , (NY: Longmans,
Green) , 1945.
48Stanley G. Payne, Franco's Spain , (NY: Thomas Crowell,
1967) , p. 114.
49
Hermet, p. 50.




As a consequence of its dispersion, fragmentation, and
discouragement, the PCE was also fragmented in its leader-
ship so that the early years of exile became a time of
"squaring of accounts". The leadership in the USSR was
contested by Jose Diaz (the wartime Secretary-General of
the party) , Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria) , who had
gained great fame and influence as a result of her charis-
matic and impassioned wartime exhortations, and Jesus
Hernandez, who had attained membership in the Comintern as
Minister for the International Brigades. Meanwhile Carrillo
in France and Heriberto Quinones, leader of the Communist
underground apparatus in Spain, presented additional, con-
flicting views as to what should be PCE policy in opposition
to the Franco regime.
The internecine struggle in the Soviet Union was particu-
larly bitter. Jesus Hernandez, in his book, Yo fui ministro
de Stalin , describes this internal leadership struggle
and suggests that the competing factions used the Stalin
purges to riddle opposition ranks. He also indicates his
own belief that the death of Jose Diaz, who fell from a
window of the hospital in which he was being treated for
tuberculosis, was not as "accidental" as was claimed.
Shortly after Diaz 1 death in 1942, Hernandez was, in essence,
banished from the Soviet Union and Dolores Ibarruri, whom





the Soviets had been grooming, succeeded to the PCE
Secretary-Generalship
.
Inside Spain the party machine was severely and brutally
repressed by Franco police. Nearly 200,000 Republicans,
many, if not most, of whom were Communists, were either
executed or died in prison. During these times little
effort could be made to maintain contact with exiled leaders
in Moscow, and activites inside Spain were limited to
occasional terrorist attacks. This situation existed until
the end of World War II when internal activities could again
receive some direction from the leadership in exile. They
continued on-and-off until the French-Spanish border was
re-opened in 1951 and more extensive contacts could be
maintained. Even then, however, internal activities were
severely hampered as Franco police periodically destroyed
52functioning Communist cells.
Paul Preston provides a concise account of the conflict
between the exiled leadership and the internal leadership
of the PCE:
...the communists left behind in 1939 had
kept alive a primitive organization which
attempted to help prisoners, distribute
propaganda and occasionally attack Falangist
offices. A militant from the Canary
Islands, Heriberto Quifiones, emerged as
leader and claimed that the party should be




death of Quinones at the hands of the police,
the Central Committee denounced the crime
of ' Quifionismo ' , or excessive independence
of the exiled leadership. Clashes were con-
stant and it has been alleged that the
party simply denounced recalcitrant leaders
to the Francoists. In 1945, the execution
of the veteran Gabriel Leon Trilla was
carried out by militants. Accused of
theft by the party, it seems more likely
that his crime was his belief that the
exiles were out of touch with the real
situation in Spain. 53
Compounding the PCE ' s own lack of unity was the fact
that the Republican government-in-exile had also ostracized
the party. Consequently, until the end of World War II,
the PCE was not a member of any accepted anti-Franco opposi-
tion group. In 1943 the Socialists and a variety of liberal
Republican groups had formed the Junta Espariola de Liberacion
(JEL) in Mexico. Later, a parallel JEL was formed in
liberated France. In 1944 the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas
Democraticas (ANFD) was formed in the interior of Spain.
Composed of Republicans, Socialists and anarchist elements,
it was destined to be, with the exception of the PCE, the
most significant group of anti-Franco opposition forces until
541974.
At the end of World War II and quite in harmony with the
Soviet Union's return to the popular front tactic, the PCE
53Paul Preston, "The Dilemma of Credibility: The Spanish
Communist Party, The Franco Regime and After," Government
and Opposition , Winter, 1976, p. 64.
54Paul Preston, ed., Spain in Crisis , (NY: Barnes &
Noble, 1976) , p. 132.
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sought to join the Republican anti-Franco opposition. In
July 1945 the PCE joined the ANFD, and in 1946 the PCE
announced its full support of the Republican government-
in-exile. Santiago Carrillo joined the Giral government
as Minister without Portfolio, and Vincente Uribe followed
him as a member of the Llopis government until its demise
in 1947. Developing Cold War tensions and continued
Socialist and Republican suspicion of the PCE prevented any
subsequent uniting of these groups and the PCE. Nonetheless,
in 1948 the PCE continued to call for a national front of
all forces opposed to the Franco regime. Although unanswered,
this call became the basic policy of the PCE until Franco's
death in 1975. 55
Disunity continued between 1948 and 1952 as many "Tito-
ite bandits" were discovered among the party ranks. Also,
the PCE ' s anti-NATO policy resulted in the expulsion of many
Communist leaders from France. The party headquarters, which
had been located in France since the end of World War II was
at this time transferred to Eastern Europe and Moscow to
5 6
escape surveillance by French police. It was very likely
that the PCE leaders soon discovered that all that was
really changed by the move was the brand of police doing the








were able to reassert control over the party's underground
activities in Spain. Following Stalin's suggestion, guerrilla
tactics were dropped and the PCE began to infiltrate the
57Francoist corporative vertical syndicates. The success
of this change in strategy is indicated by the fact that
most political prisoners of Franco in later years were
Communist members of trade unions. Activity within the
unions continues to the present and has become one of the
greatest sources of PCE support in Spain.
After Stalin's death in 1953, de-Stalinization resulted
in the declaration of reconciliation between the USSR and
Yugoslavia in 1955 and the recognition of the principle that
there was more than one road to socialism. For the PCE
this meant allowance for the use of peaceful means in its
struggle against Franco. Moderation became the key-note and
social revolution was relegated to the distant future. The
prime objective became the non-violent overthrow of the Franco
58
regime. By 1956 the PCE was extending invitations to
Socialists, anarchists, Catholics, and even Falangist workers
to join a movement of "national reconciliation" aimed at
overcoming Civil War divisions and uniting the workers'
struggle with the discontent of the liberal bourgeoisie
59
against the narrow Francoist oligarchy. In this way









national power was to be achieved through the creation of
a coalition based upon the working class and liberal forces
including sectors of the Church, the army and the industrial-
financial oligarchy. The immediate objective of the hoped-
for coalition was the overthrow of Franco and the establish-
ment of fundamental political liberties as the first step
on the road to the creation of a pluralist, democratic
6
socialism. Despite glowing PCE claims, the policy of
"national reconciliation" was not highly successful owing
to the improving economic conditions in Spain after 1953 and
to the still-remaining antipathy of the other underground
anti-Francoists. The "Day of National Reconciliation" of
5 May 1958 and the "Peaceful National Strike" of 18 June
1959 inspired only sporadic participation.
In 1960 Santiago Carrillo was appointed Secretary-General
of the party and Dolores Ibarruri was "kicked upstairs" to
the honorary post of Chairman of the Central Committee.
Since then, the PCE has continued to expound the virtues
of national reconciliation (later to become the Pact for
Liberty) to oppose the Franco dictatorship and move along
the peaceful road to national power.
Opposition to this moderate line emerged from the party
left in 1963 when the Madrid students 1 faction broke away
Ibid.
, p. 66
61 Ibid., p. 73
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from the PCE to form a more radical PCE-ML (Marxist-Leninist)
.
This faction followed the Chinese line and spread mostly
among left-wing students of the Marxist-Leninist movement.
To date this party has been rent with division and disagree-
ment, resulting in several schisms which have severely
limited its effectiveness. Among the groups at this end of
the left Communist spectrum are the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria
,
the Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista del Primero de Qctubre
(GRAPO) , the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriotica
(FRAP) , and some elements of the Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA)
,
the violent Basque separatist organization. None of these
fi 2
groups has a large membership or following , however,
numerous terrorist acts actually performed by these radical
leftist groups have been attributed to the PCE. Despite
continuing claims of non-complicity, the PCE has found its
implied association with radical leftist groups to be a
serious impediment to its efforts to increase its influence
among middle-class elements of Spanish society.
In 1964 opposition also emerged from the right of party
ranks as the party's most sophisticated theorist, Fernando
Claudin became critical of the Carrillo philosophy of courting
bourgeois elements. While Carrillo believed that Spanish
economic conditions were such that a bourgeois democratic




achieved, Claudin argued that the Spanish economy had
developed beyond that point and was ripe for a direct
transition to socialism. However, Carrillo, with a strong
grasp on party controls, did not admit to criticism. Claudin
was accused of defeatism and revisionism and expelled from
the party. For the remainder of the 1960's Carrillo per-
sisted with the line criticized by Claudin, but also pro-
gressively modified his position and later admitted that
Claudin' s analysis had been correct. Apparently, Claudin
had only erred in being right too soon.
Throughout the 1960's the PCE also increasingly favored
the principle of autonomy for each party within the inter-
national communist movement, following the Italian example.
But the real watershed of PCE views came with the Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Three weeks after
the invasion, the PCE made clear its opposition to the
invasion and all that it represented for independent-thinking
communist parties:
Spanish Communists could neither conceive
nor accept the hypothesis which our enemies
are today in a position to forward, that
once the Communist Party has come to power
in Spain in partnership with the forces of
labor and culture, another Socialist Power —
no matter which — could dictate policies
to us. Even less can we conceive or accept
that such a Power could intervene militarily
in our territory without the most energetic
resistance on our part. 64





This party position was to gain prestige for the PCE
among Western communist parties, but it was gained at the
cost of further dissension within the PCE. Two high party
officials, Eduardo Garcia and Agustin Gomez, were forced
out of the party for their opposition to the PCE ' s stance
protesting the invasion. They were soon joined by Enrique
Lister, probably the third ranking personality in the party
at the time, who left in protest over the party's anti-Soviet
stand. The Lister faction formed a rival-PCE, reincarnated
the name of the old PCOE, and fiercely supported a return
to monolithic communism and closer ties to the CPSU as opposed
to the polycentric policies of the Carrillo faction. This
conflict remains to this day and has been the source of
unsuccessful Soviet actions attempting to disgrace the
Carrillo PCE and install the Lister PCOE as the legitimate
Communist party in Spain.
Perhaps sensing future developments, or perhaps just to
negate an important aspect of dissident critiques, that no
party congress had been held in seven years, Carrillo con-
vened the 8th Congress of the PCE in October 1972 at an
undisclosed location. The official outcome of the congress
was an eleven-point political resolution reemphasizing well-
known features of PCE policy of which key points were:
65Preston, "Crisis", p. 150
6 6
Richard Staar, ed. , Yearbook on International Communist
Affairs, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 216.
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1. The conquest of political liberties in Spain
which would cause the downfall of Franco was the
party's principal immediate objective.
2. Spanish membership in the European Economic
Community was to be encouraged to further coop-
eration with other leftist forces toward creating
a socialist Europe.
3. Party cadres should increase their political
work among the more than one million Spanish
immigrant workers in Western Europe.
4. A call for solidarity among socialist countries
based on respect for the independence of each
party and non-interference, in word as well as
fi 7
fact, in internal affairs.
Two additional points defined the "Pact for Liberty" and
the PCE ' s vision of the Spanish society which the Pact
would produce. The Pact for Liberty was to be a call for
all opposition forces to unite around a minimum temporary
program which would include a provisional government,
amnesty for political prisoners, political liberties and
elections to a constitutional legislature. The success of
the Pact would create a socialist Spain in which fundamental
political liberties would be respected. Plurality of parties
C -7
Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Spanish Communism in the 1970' s".
Problems of Communism, March/April, 1975, p. 50.
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would exist as would freedom of information and criticism.
Finally, no attempt would be made to impose an official
6 8philosophy. The Pact for Liberty was soon to become the
basis for the PCE ' s legalization and emergence as a prime




III. THE PCE PRESENT
A. ORGANIZATION
The PCE is organized nominally along traditional communist
party lines. National leadership is provided by a small
Secretariat (headed by Secretary-General and party leader,
Santiago Carrillo) , an Executive Committee of 25 to 30
members, and a Central Committee numbering 120 to 130 mem-
1 2bers. ' In 1960 the honorary post of Party President
(Chairman of the Central Committee) was created especially
for Dolores Ibarruri when she was replaced by Carrillo as
Secretary-General. The organizational pyramid continues
to expand through the Party Congress, provincial and regional
committees, down to the local level.
A unique form of the PCE organizational structure is
its division into regional communist parties. The regional
parties of Asturias, Andalusia, Galicia, Euzkadi and Cata-
lonia cater to the regional feelings of their respective
Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division of Congressional Research Service, A
Report on West European Communist Parties
,
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 150. Hereinafter,
WECP.
2 Staar, 1977, p. 223, gives the following numbers for
1976: 7-member Secretariat, 35-member Executive Committee,
and 142-member Central Committee. However, due to the
dynamics of intraparty interaction, actual numbers of each




areas and attempt to translate them into support for the
Communists. Although, in theory, the regional parties
are autonomous units, at present only the Catalonian PSUC
is able to express any kind of independence. According
to Mclnnes, "Their (the regional parties') leaders are
appointed by the PCE. Their existence is intended to dis-
arm provincialist suspicion of the PCE ' s Castilian centralism,
as well as to combat local oppositions on the Left. These
latter are especially dangerous for communism in the Basque
4
country." Regional congresses were conducted by all the
regional parties in preparation for the 9th PCE Party Con-
gress held in April 1977.
The transition from clandestinity to open operation has
had some effect on party functioning as the PCE goal of
becoming a mass party is pursued. As early as 1960 the
party dropped the requirement for new members to adhere to
cells. In 1976 the cells themselves were dissolved as the
party moved to an "open" system of labor, school and neigh-
borhood branches, a reorganization designed to better enable
the party to operate in a democratic electoral environment.
4Neil Mclnnes, The Communist Parties of Western
Europe
,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975) , p. 114
5Staar, 1977, p. 224.
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The party has historically operated on the principle
of democratic centralism
, the effect of which has been
accentuated by the party's organizational structure, long
years of clandestine existence and separation from the
party leadership living in exile. Party congresses have
averaged only one every eight years since 1939, and the
physical dispersion of the top leadership has made even
7
regular Executive Committee meetings difficult.
In the wake of the party's legalization and Eurocommunist
orientation, the strict application of democratic centralism
has been liberalized somewhat. Dissatisfaction arising from
the PCE ' s recent changing of its description from "Marxist-
Leninist" to "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary"
seemed to arise less from the change of description itself
than from the strong-arm methods of the upper leadership
gin guiding the change to fruition.
Democratic centralism is a process by which all party
members theoretically are free to discuss alternative
viewpoints. Decisions based upon these discussions are
supposedly consolidated at progressively higher levels of
the organization until the official party policy is enun-
ciated. At such time, discussion must end and all members
adhere to the official line. In actuality, the will of the
upper leadership is easily imposed upon the faithful because,
since no discussion is allowed between groups at the lower
levels, the true will of the majority is never known.
WECP, p. 150.
gJames M. Markham, "Top Spanish Red Opens Parley with





During the Civil War years and the early years of exile
which followed, the PCE received most of its financial
support from the Soviet Union. In the early exile years
the PCE also received some benefit from the use of funds
entrusted by the Negrin government to the PCF for purchase
of arms in France. Fund raising campaigns conducted by
various communist parties on behalf of the PCE produced
. . . . . 9limited additional monies. As these funds were depleted
the party became even more dependent upon the Soviet Union
for assistance. However, since 1968 PCE criticism of the
Soviet Union has resulted in Moscow's cutting off its finan-
cial assistance to the PCE and subsequent bankrolling of
the pro-Soviet Lister faction. During recent years, the
PCE has relied heavily upon support provided in the form
of radio time, publishing facilities, use of homes for PCE
leaders and use of meeting facilities provided by fraternal




until 1968 and Romania thereafter.
Other financial support came from membership dues and








and Eastern Europe. In 1968 a major fund drive called
"Thirty Million Pesetas for the Spanish Communist Party"
collected nearly 45 million pesetas of which 75% came from
14
outside of Spain. The Communist Parties of France, Italy,
Romania and Yugoslavia have apparently increased their moral
15
and financial support to the PCE in recent years. Very
recently, Carrillo stated that the PCE had not received




The party also derives monies from the sale of books,
pamphlets and other literature. For example, Carrillo is
donating the proceeds from the sales of Eurocommunism and
the State to party coffers. The book was on a number of
West European "best seller" lists for several weeks and
reportedly had brisk sales in Eastern Europe as well, even
17though it was banned there.
C. SIZE
In its early years the party consisted of only a small
number of members. Fractionalism and schisms, always
Ibid.
14 Hermet, p. 108.
15WECP, p. 155, 164.
16Paris AFP reportage of Carrillo speech to PCE rally
12 June 1977 as reported in FBIS-WE, 13 June 1977, p. N4
.
Felipe Sahagan, Dispatch to Madrid Domestic Service,




recurring problems in the PCE, have worked to prevent any-
steady growth of the party.
The years of the Second Republic saw the greatest growth
of the PCE. From a membership of 1000 in 1931, the party
grew to a reported 20,000 in October of 1934. By the beginning
18
of the Civil War, the PCE claimed nearly 300,000 followers.
Owing to its illegal status since 1939 and its suppression
by the Franco regime, the party has remained small until
recent years. During its exile years, the PCE's membership
was variously estimated at 5000 to 7000 hard-core militants
19in Spam plus 12,000 to 20,000 members in exile.
The PCE today claims to have 100,000 members and is
aiming for 300,000 in the near future. The party claims
that it now has organized groups in all fifty provinces of
20Spain. As exiled members continue to return to Spain and
the party benefits from legal operation and recruiting,
membership should show an increase so that it is reasonable
to assume that the 300,000 membership goal will be attained
or even surpassed.
D. COMPOSITION
The PCE, despite its efforts to broaden its base, remains
primarily a working class party. Its major areas of importance
18 Sworakowski, p. 400.
19WECP, p. 14 8.
20Staar, 1977, p. 223.
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lie in the industrial areas of Madrid, Barcelona, the Basque
21
region and Andalusia. The party's real strength in the
mining areas of Asturias, traditionally claimed by the PCE
as a stronghold, has been put in doubt by the meager vote
the PCE received from the region in the June 1977 elections.
Since the 1960 's, the PCE has been highly successful
in gaining influence in the (until recently, illegal)
Comisiones Qbreros (Workers' Commissions - CC 00). PCE
members have progressively moved into high leadership posi-
tions in the commissions and have gained much worker respect
for their dedication and organizing efforts. The PCE claims
a CC 00 membership of one million and the Chairman of the
CC 00, Marcelino Camacho, is also a member of the PCE Executive
22Committee.
PCE efforts to recruit students and intellectuals have
not been previously successful. Since the 1960 's leftist
groups more radical in outlook that the PCE have proved more
23
appealing to these recruiting targets. Moreover, the
party has not been very good at making effective use of this




24 Hermet, p. 106.
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majority of today's PCE members are young" and that "the
average age of our party's members does not exceed twenty-
five or twenty-six years, although there are some small
25
sectors of people who are veterans." The PCE also re-
ceives support from a limited number of priests and mili-
tary officers. In fact, Francisco Garcia Salve, a Catholic
priest, is a leading member of the Central Committee.
Nonetheless, the numbers of members from the above two





Just as the past has had a pronounced effect on the
PCE today, so has the past had 'a marked effect upon its
leader, Santiago Carrillo. In turn, his views and control
have shaped the PCE into a unique entity among world communist
parties.
Born in Asturias in 1919, Carrillo was the son of a
trade unionist and moderate Socialist deputy, Wenceslao
Carrillo. Himself originally a Socialist, Carrillo rose to
become Secretary of the Socialist Youth Federation (FJS)
.
In 1936 he quietly joined the Communists and engineered the
25Madrid Domestic Service reportage of undated Alfonso
Diez interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in





union of the FJS with the Union of Young Communists to form
the Unified Socialist Youth Federation (JSU) . The JSU soon
became one of the main props for the Communist Party and
27Carrillo was named to the Central Committee in 1937. He
was also a member of the Junta for the Defense of Madrid
and, as mentioned elsewhere, he was one of the last
28Communists to leave Spain in 1939.
During the early part of the Civil War, Carrillo,
then only twenty-one years old, was the Republican Chief
of Public Order. He has been accused of supervising the
mass execution of several thousand political prisoners in
29
the Madrid suburb of Paracuellos de Jarama.
In recent interviews Carrillo has repeatedly denied
his complicency in the actual killings, saying that he only
issued the orders for the transfer of the prisoners during
which time they were intercepted and killed by unknown
forces. To what extent his actual guilt can ever be proven
the title, "Assassin of Paracuellos", is nonetheless part





"A Parfait Gentil Knyght", National Review , 4 February
1977, p. 137.
30
"Rattling Bones", Economist, 15 January 1977, p. 46.
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By the end of World War II, Carrillo was in France
operating under the name of "Monsieur Giscard" and reestab-
lishing contacts with the organization in Spain. By 1947
he was seen at the side of Dolores Ibarruri and other impor-
tant party figures on public occasions. During the early
1950' s, Carrillo was apparently responsible for the de-
Stalinization of the PCE and for the institution of the
policy of national reconciliation and by 1960 Carrillo had
consolidated his hold to such an extent that he was elected
Secretary-General of the party. During the 1960 's, Carrillo'
s
ideas on national reconciliation became firmly established
party policy as did increasing autonomy and independence
from Moscow's views. Carrillo 's attempts to broaden the
appeal of the PCE through these two main tenets of party
policy also became the source of accusations of treachery
and opportunism from the leftist youth of the party and the
Stalinist faction on the right, and was the basis for the
splitting from the party of these two factions. However,
Carrillo maintained an iron hand as demonstrated by the
PCE ' s maintaining its vocal opposition to the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Since 1968, but especially in the last three years,
the PCE ' s stance of increasingly vocal opposition to the
Soviet model of communism and the CPSU's hegemonic pretentions
over other parties has become the basis of Carrillo 's concept
of Eurocommunism and for his call for the alignment of the
Western communist parties to form a solid front of independent,
56

national communist parties in opposition to Moscow.
Carrillo emphasized this concept at the June 1976 meeting
of European Communist and Workers Parties in East Berlin
and his March 1977 meeting in Madrid with Georges Marchais
of the French Communist Party (PCF) and Enrico Berlinguer
of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which has since been
called the "Eurocommunist Summit." Since the PCE, PCF and
31PCI combined compose over 92% of the West European communists,
the meeting was not insignificant. Moreover, even though
no direct threat to the Soviet Union emerged, the implica-
tions of convergence of views of the three parties toward
the idea of independent roads to communism were clear.
Carrillo 's role in urging and organizing the Madrid
talks must certainly have been in the forefront of Soviet
thinking because, a few days after the Spanish election re-
sults were made known, a scathing article was published in
Novoye Vremya (New Times ) severely criticizing the ideas
Carrillo presented in Eurocommunism and the State . . The
conflict has continued with varying degrees of intensity
including the November 1977 refusal by the CPSU to allow
Carrillo to make his planned speech at the rally in Moscow
marking the 6 0th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
Ultimately, the PCE today is largely a creature of
the Carrillo philosophy of communism as expressed in several
David L. Helms, "The Eurocommunist Challenge and the
Eastern European and Soviet Response", Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, 1977, p. 13.
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of his writings, Despues de Franco,,: que? (After Franco,
32
What?) , Nuevos enfoques a problemas de hoy (New Views on
33Problems of Today) , and Eurocommunismo y estado (Euro-
34
communism and the State) . By virtue of the last book,
Carrillo extended his concept of how the PCE will come to
power in Spain to apply to all democratic states of Europe.
Since Eurocommunism has in this way become identified with
Santiago Carrillo and the PCE, a discussion of the develop-
ment of Eurocommunism and the PCE ' s position in the movement
is provided in another chapter of this study.
2 . Dolores Ibarruri
Born into an Asturian miner's family on 9 December
351895, Dolores Ibarruri Gomez, "La Pasionaria" is now the
most venerated "elder statesman" of the PCE. Hugh Thomas
provides a particularly vivid characterization of Ibarruri
in her early years:
...as a girl, she had been a devout Catholic.
In those days she wandered from village to
village in the Basque provinces, selling
sardines from a great tray which she bore on
her head. But Dolores la Sardinera married
a miner from Asturias, one of the obscure
Santiago Carrillo, Despues de Franco, dque? , (Paris:
Editiones Sociales, 1965).
33 Santiago, Carrillo, Nuevos enfoques a problemas de hoy .
(Paris: Editiones Sociales, 1967).
34Santiago Carrillo, Eurocomunismo y estado . (Barcelona:
Editorial Critica, 1977) .
35Meaning "passion flower" , Ibarruri first took the name as
a nom-de-plume for a series of newspaper articles for a Social-
ist weekly in 1918; she soon lived up to it with a passionate
involvement in politics both before and during the Civil War.
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founders of the Communist party in
northern Spain. She transferred her
devotion from Our Lady of Begofia to
the prophet of the British Museum Reading
Room. 35
Originally a member of the Socialist Youth, then of
the PSOE, she joined the fledgling PCE when it was first
established. She rapidly rose in the organization, being
admitted to the Central Committee in 1930. During the
Asturias uprising, her impassioned oratory inspired the
militants and greatly enhanced both her prestige in the
party and her notoriety among opponents.
Always dressed in black, with a grave but
fanatical face which caused the masses who
listened to her platform speeches to suppose
her a kind of revolutionary saint. 37
In 1935 she was elected to the Presidium of the Comintern
and in 1936, as Deputy for Oviedo, she became Vice President
3 8
of the Cortes.
During the seige of Madrid in the early months of
the Civil War, her fiery oratory was an inspiration to the
Republican militias who defended the city with unmatched
fanaticism. Throughout the war La Pasionaria was looked upon





, p . 8
.
37J Ibid.




She became celebrated for her appeals to
Spanish womanhood to bear sons without the
encumbrance of husbands. The Right spread
rumors that she had once cut a priest's
throat with her own teeth. But ... she
was unrebellious in her adherence to party
instructions from Moscow. 40
With the fall of the Republic she sought asylum
in the Soviet Union where she succeeded Jose Diaz as PCE
Secretary-General in 1942. In 1943 her signature was among
41those on the document dissolving the Comintern. Except
for two years in France and Romania (1944-1945) , she lived
in Moscow from 1939 until her return to Spain in 1977.
While in Moscow she devoted her time to improving the lot
of her fellow Spaniards also living there. Her son was
killed in the Battle of Stalingrad and a daughter is married
to a Russian general, so that her ties to the USSR remain
strong despite her returning to Spain as soon as she could
42be issued a passport. From I960, when Santiago Carrillo
succeeded her as Secretary-General of the party, until her
return to Spain, she remained in the background, only making
periodic appearances at major party events or to exhort the









Upon her return to Spain after the PCE's legalization
she became a PCE candidate to the Cortes and was elected
by her old constituency in northern Asturias. Also, she
has maintained tacit support of Carrillo's independent
stance from Moscow and his Eurocommunist outlook, much to
the disappointment of those in the party who are dissatis-
fied with Carrillo's leadership.
3. Other Factors
The personal leadership is clearly evident in the
great esteem in which the membership holds Carrillo,
Ibarruri and, to a lesser extent, a few of the other top
leaders such as Santiago Alvarez and Manuel Azcarte. Des-
pite his protestations that he is not God, and that the
cult of personality no longer exists, it is nevertheless
true that "Don Santiago" is highly revered by most of the
membership who greatly praise him at every sort of PCE
gathering. It is also evident that Carrillo basks in his
popularity, attending all major PCE meetings to accept the
fielty of his followers. As a consequence, any PCE policy
output will be highly colored by the personality of Santiago
Carrillo.
Secondly, largely due to the traditional communist
organizational structure, the leadership is highly centralized.
The long years of exile and clandestine operations have
served to accentuate this quality in the PCE. Certainly,
PCE policy decisions, even though requiring final approval
by Carrillo, are thoroughly analyzed and substantiated by
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the Executive Committee, made up of Carrillo's staunchest
and most powerful supporters. Even the top leadership of
the regional parties, although ostensibly autonomous, are
mere functionaries in those sub-organizations, representing
and being controlled by the PCE leadership. The top
leadership is thoroughly familiar with every aspect of the
party and supremely competent to engineer the required
"consensus" for any projected action. Consequently, in
any PCE policy action, any serious criticism will be stifled
well in advance of the policy pronouncement, a basic
characteristic of democratic centralism.
Thirdly, even though the PCE leadership is growing
older (Ibarruri is eighty-three years old, Carrillo is
fifty-nine, and the majority of the remainder of the top
leaders are veterans of the Civil War years) , they are
determined and quite able to hold on against a younger group
which is growing in influence. The "generation gap" is
indicated by a young PCE dissident's comment, "The leaders
speak of liberalism, but obedience remains the word. They
43
simply want to maintain their positions." Nevertheless,
the "old guard" remains in control. Consequently, for the
forseeable future at least, any PCE policy action will be
highly representative of the views, acquired over many years
of spartan existence, of the older leadership.




1973 marked an historic turning point for the PCE '
s
efforts to become public. The developing energy crisis and
the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's
apparently designated successor, in late 197 3 convinced the
entrenched right that change must be allowed to take place
gradually, though as slowly as possible, before it occurred
by force. This apertura enabled the PCE to work more freely
in gaining support for its desired legalization.
Building upon regional round-tables or "democratic
juntas", based on the model of the Asamblea de Catalunya
,
and armed with their Pact for Liberty, the Communists moved
quickly to extend and intensify contacts with neo-capitalist
groups anxious for dialogue with the party. On 30 July 197 4
the Communists announced the existence of the Junta Democratica ,
described as a "temporary convergence of the working class
44
and neo-capitalist forces." The Junta was a coalition of
opposition parties, the Partido Carlista (PC) , the Partido
Socialista Popular (PSP) , and the PCE plus various personali-
45ties who were members of the Opus Dei. It issued a twelve-
point Manifesto which called for a provisional government,





parties, free trade unions, a free press, an independent
judiciary, recognition of regional "personalities" and
46
separation of Church and State. Soon after the formation
of the Junta, the extreme left issued violent denunciations
that the PCE had "sold out" to the bourgeoisie. They were
joined in their denunciations by elements of the PCE left,
but Carrillo prevailed with the argument that realism
demanded such compromise and that alliance with the bour-
47geoisie was essential for the overthrow of the regime.
Fearing hegemonic intentions of the PCE over the Spanish
left and suffering from its own conflict between competing
exile and interior leadership factions, the PSOE declined
to join the Junta. At the PSOE October 1974 party congress
the PSOE exiles, who favored the Junta, were defeated and
Felipe Gonzalez was elected Secretary-General of the recon-
stituted PSOE. The PSOE subsequently organized an opposing
leftist coalition with the Christian Democrats and anti-PCE
Marxists groups and announced the formation of the Platform
of Democratic Convergence in July 1975.
The excesses of the Franco regime in September of 1975
accelerated the trend toward cooperation between the two
similar, but opposing, groups, eventually producing a merger
of the Junta and the Platform in January 1976. The new
46Jonathon Story, "Spanish Political Parties: Before and
After the Election", Government and Opposition , Fall 1977,
p. 483.
47
Preston, "Dilemma", p. 83.
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organization, officially named Democratic Coordination, but
more popularly called the Platajunta
,
produced a compromise
program which had two interesting elements. First, the
PSOE-led Platform got first billing in the group's informal
title, reflecting its need to project an image of resurgent
strength in the Spanish left. Secondly, the key demand of
the program was the legalization of the PCE, reflecting the
more immediate political needs of the Communists. Perhaps
the basis for the PSOE's support for the PCE ' s demands for
legalization was the thought that a legal PCE would be less
of a threat than a clandestine PCE.
In November 1975, after a valiant struggle, Francisco
Franco finally succumbed to the ravages of age and disease.
If he had hoped that his regime would live after him, he
had not reckoned with the young Juan Carlos, the grandson
of King Alfonso XIII, whom Franco had designated as his
successor. According to Stanley Payne, "Most observers
agree that the political transformation that occurred in
Spain after the death of Franco ... (was) impressive and
48in some respects breathtaking." The credit for this
remarkable transformation belongs to King Juan Carlos. He
deftly maintained Franco's right-hand man Carlos Arias
Navarro as his own Prime Minister to prevent any fatal back-
lash from the military and entrenched right, while he
48Stanley G. Payne, "The Political Transformation of
Spain", Current History, November 1977, p. 165.
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encouraged slow expansion of civil rights and liberalization
of the Spanish political structure. In July 1976 Juan
Carlos moved to accelerate the changes taking place in
Spanish politics and society. He accepted Arias Navarro's
previously submitted, pro-forma resignation and installed
his personal selection, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez as Premier.
The left quickly moved to adjust to the changing
political situation. Succumbing to pressures to widen its
representation to increase its strength vis-a-vis the
rightists of the Popular Alliance in bargaining with the
Suarez government, the Platajunta constitued a new organi-
zation called the Platform of Democratic Organizations (POD)
which included many of the regional movements previously
49
excluded. Intricate political maneuvering between Prime
Minister Suarez, the Right and the Left, represented by
the POD, occurred throughout early 1977 until 9 April. On
that date the PCE achieved an important goal as the legali-
zation of the party was announced by the Spanish government.
The PCE Executive Committee expressed the jubiliation of
PCE members and supporters all over Spain:
The Spanish Communist Party has regained
its right to a legal existence. We greet
this as a triumph for the cause of democracy
for which we have never ceased to fight for
one single day in the 38 years of our harsh




the policy of reconciliation which the PCE
has advocated since 1956 and which today has
been adopted by the vast majority of all
Spaniards
.
The joy which is being expressed at this
very moment throughout the country by thou-
sands of men and women among the working
people and among people of culture, by
communists of several generations . . . reflects
how much the legalization of the Communist
party was a need felt by the majority of
the people. 5
G. ELECTIONS OF 15 JUNE 1977
Soon after the PCE was legalized, Spanish attention
turned to the campaign for the constituent Cortes to be
elected 15 June 1977. The three weeks of campaigning were
surprisingly calm and civilized, belying the warnings of
pessimistic doomsayers. Yet the campaign was also lively
and colorful. Adolfo Suarez, the designated Prime Minister
who had successfully engineered the post-Franco transition
to date, campaigned under auspices of the Union of the
Democratic Center (UDC) , a confederation of fifteen centrist
parties. Making full use of his media background and his
youthfulness, Suarez was highly effective in television and
radio appearances.
Felipe Gonzalez, Secretary-General of the PSOE and also
youthful, "blitzed Spain in an American-style campaign.
Riding in a Learjet, reading Don Quixote between stops, he
Radio Independent Spain broadcast of PCE Executive
Committee communique, 11 April 1977 as reported in FBIS-WE,




made so many appearances that the press dubbed him 'Hurricane
Felipe' . " 51
Meanwhile Santiago Carrillo, reflecting the moderate
tone of the PCE campaign, traveled to various rallies in
his armored, 1956 Cadillac (a gift from Nicolae Ceausescu)
.
Ardent PCE followers endearingly called him "Don Santiago",
while opponents dubbed him "Friar Carrillo" for his concilia-
52tory pronouncements. Despite dazzling rallies such as
the campaign finale outside of Madrid which drew over
200,000 people, the PCE campaign was most remarkable for
its unrevolutionary soft-sell, based upon Carrillo 's simple
aim to implant the PCE as a respectable political party in
a country where it had been banned and repressed for thirty-
eight years and in which serious rightist opposition still
53 ...
exists. The degree of PCE moderation is indicated by an
early campaign statement by Carrillo:
...the first point of the PCE ' s program is
to tell Spaniards to vote in accordance
with their consciences, without fearing how
they vote. If they support the right, they
should vote for the right; if they support
the center, they should vote for the center;
but if they support the left, they should
have the courage to give their vote to the
left without fear of any reprisals whatsoever.
It is essential that in these elections,
Spaniards should go to vote in the conviction
Raymond Carrol, "Spain: Up the Middle", Newsweek
,
27 June 1977, p. 38.
52
"Spain's Red Luther", Newsweek , 11 July 1977, p. 38
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that they are indeed free to vote as they
wish and that no one is going to know for
whom they voted: That is to say, there
will be no reprisals. 54
At the close of the campaign Spanish voters went
freely to the polls for the first time since the generals'
revolt plunged Spain into Civil War forty-one years before
Charles Gallagher points to the significance of this
signal event of the post-Franco era:
By successfully carrying out nationwide free
and secret elections on June 15 for the
designation of a new Cortes elected by uni-
versal suffrage, Spain has effectively
completed its transition to a pluralistic
parliamentary democracy in the relatively
brief period of a year and a half. More
rapidly and with less violence than almost
anyone would have thought possible, an
authoritarian regime embedded in seemingly
impregnable legal walls and which had
lasted four decades was dismantled — and
even persuaded to self-destruct — without
the intervention of a civil war, an inter-
national conflict, a coup, a revolution, or
a foreign adventure, at least one of which
was needed to bring down every similar
regime in our time. All was done within a
framework of law and order, and altogether,
it represented a feat unprecedented in
Spanish history and unparalleled in European
political behavior since the peaceful revolu-
tion of 1688 in England which produced the
Bill of Rights. 55
For the PCE the elections were to be the prime example of
how a Eurocommunist party would conduct itself within the
democratic political system which it purported to desire.
54 . . .Madrid Domestic Service undated Alfonso Diez interview
with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE, 11 May
1977, p. N2.
55Charles F. Gallagher, "Reflections on the Spanish
Elections", Field Staff Reports , West Europe Studies,
Vol. XII, No. 2, 2 July 1977, p. 1.

Although minor irregularities did occur, the election
by all accounts was fairly and impartially conducted. In
some districts, suspiciously many of which were working
class, the unexpectedly heavy voter turnout resulted in
130,000 ballotless voters who were required to wait two
days for additional ballots to arrive before they could
cast their votes. The PCE and other smaller parties
criticized the use of the d'Hont system of proportional
voting decreed by the electoral law as being discriminatory
and tending to downgrade their importance. The results of
the election are portrayed in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1.
An analysis of the results presents a number of
implications for the PCE to consider:
1. The turnout of approximately 80% of eligible voters
casting ballots and the free campaigning which was allowed
the 150-odd parties and splinter parties indicate that the
elections gave a fairly true picture of Spanish political
feeling. While fifty-seven percent of the votes cast were
for parties which oppose any kind of continuity with Francoism,
the overall results indicated a voter profile similar to
that existing in France where two political groupings
dominate -- the center-right versus the combined left.
2. The PCE did worse than the thirty seats it expected




Popular Vote (%) Seats (%)
6,220,889 34.71 165 47.14
5,240,464 29.24 118 33.71
1,655,744 9.24 20 5.71
1,503,376 8.39 16 4.57
804,382 4.48 6 1.71
SPANISH ELECTION RETURNS, JUNE 1977
CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES
Party





Note: The remainder of the vote and the 25 other seats divided by
regional and splinter parties.
SENATE
Party Seats
Union of the Democratic Center 106
Socialist Workers' Party 48
Senators for Democracy 19
Others 34
Appointed by the king 41
Note: The government has not released any national popular vote
totals for the Senate.
Note: Senators for Democracy were supported by the Christian
Democrats, the Socialist Workers* Party, and the Communists
as joint candidates in some provinces.
Note: These tables were released in July 1977 by the Spanish
government.
Source: Meisler, Stanley, "Spain's New Democracy", Foreign Affairs ,
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Distribution of Seats by Historical Regions
OTHER
PCE REG-
AP UCD PSOE PSP PSUC NATL C-R L
32 Madrid 3 11 11 3 4
47 Catalonia 1 9 15 8 11 2 1
26 Pais Vasco
(w/Navarre)
1 7 9 8 1










10 Asturias 1 4 4 1
14 Aragon 7 5 1
27 Galicia 4 20 3
14 Leon 2 9 3
30 Old Castile 2 21 7
17 New Castile 1 10 6
12 Extrema-
dura . 8 4
6 Baleari cs 4 2




350 16 165 118 20 19
AP - Alianza Popular
UCD - Union de Centro Democratico
PSOE- Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol
PSP - Partido Socialista Popular
PCE - Partido Comunista de Espana
Regional Nationalists - in Catalonia: Pacte Democratic per Catalunya
in Pais Vasco: Partido Nacional Vasco




might lead an observer to believe existed and much less
than the PCE ' s own propaganda had claimed. Carrillo
explained the lower than expected PCE vote was due to the
limited time which the party had to campaign after its
legalization and to the residual fears of rightist reaction
57 . .
among undecided voters. Pre-election polls predicting
that the PCE would get approximately ten percent of the vote
were proved true. Henceforth, the PCE propaganda machine
will have more difficulty in "puffing" the PCE ' s importance
by overstated claims of membership or support. Moreover,
the PCE's Catalan Communist affiliate, the PSUC, was respon-
sible for nearly one-third of the Communist votes and eight
of the twenty seats that the PCE gained in the Cortes.
Without this strength, the PCE would surely have been
shattered as badly as the far right. Finally, what support
the PCE did get came from industrial Madrid, Catalonia and
Andalusia — hardly a broad-based return. In fact, the PCE
received only one seat in Asturias, for a long time con-
sidered a PCE stronghold, and that went to the venerated
Dolores Ibarruri.
3. The PSOE emerged as the major significant political
party in Spanish politics. Some observers feel that mergers
with small splinter parties will soon make the PSOE the
hegemonic party in Spain. However, this feeling should be
57Radio Independent Spain reportage of Carrillo reaction
to election results, 17 June 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE,
20 June 1977, p. N5.
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tempered with the thought that a sizeable block of votes
which might have gone to the PCE may have been transferred
to the PSOE by way of voter prudence. The residue of the
bitter and unhappy remembrances of PCE activities during
the Civil War may still exist despite the PCE ' s moderate,
Eurocommunist face.
4. The Left vote was concentrated in those areas of Spain
where it has been traditionally strong, the urban-industrial
Basque lands, Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid. Consequently,
the PCE is faced with the renewed realization that it must
compete with the PSOE for votes in those regions rather than
with the UDC.
5. The UDC, while being the majority bloc, is nonetheless
a coalition and therefore, subject to disorganization and
disagreement. Possible defections from the right of the
UDC are possible, thus possibly enhancing the PSOE ' s strength
by default. Possible defections from the UDC left are also
conceivable, thereby giving the PSOE even greater prospects
for becoming the majority in the government. On the other
hand, Suarez may be able to weld the coalition together into
a truly homogeneous party in which case it could remain a
formidable political force in the future. The historical
penchant of the Spanish to follow the guidance of the forces
in power would tend to reinforce this consideration.
6. Even with possible defections from the UDC right, the
far-right Popular Alliance does not appear to be as powerful
a political force as expected.
75

Therefore, the PCE, given these implications and its
already somewhat rightist slant for a communist party,
seems to have two courses of action for future development
open to it. One is to move further to the left in its
outlook and policy. However, probably the only way for the
PCE to espouse more radical policies would be if Carrillo
were ousted. This seems to be a highly unlikely prospect
in view of Carrillo 's obviously strong grasp of party con-
trols. The other course is to continue to pursue the Pact
for Liberty, seeking a political alliance with the PSOE.
However, this course if fraught with danger as well. The
PSOE may be able to co-opt so many of the PCE ' s platform
planks that the PCE is left with little remaining appeal
for voters.
These implications seem to pose a rather bleak outlook
for the PCE in domestic politics. Perhaps for this reason
Carrillo has intensified his efforts to demonstrate that the
PCE is the guiding force behind Eurocommunism. The logic
of this move is that by demonstrating the power of the PCE
outside of Spain, the party will gain a greater following
within Spain. The hope is that the two trends will then be
mutually reinforcing toward the end of gaining real power
within Spanish politics and in the international communist
movement
.
In the year since the election, two major developments
have occurred which have solidifed the implications indicated
in the election results presented above. Both cases involve
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consolidation moves by the PCE ' s major competitors for
votes, the PSOE and the UDC
.
In the first case two recent moves by the PSOE to
consolidate its elections gains may make it more difficult
for the PCE to expand toward the center of the Spanish
political spectrum. In the one instance, the PSOE and its
rival Socialist splinter, the PSP, headed by Enrique Tierno
Galvan, have reunited under the PSOE banner. The PSP's
six seats in the Cortes equal nearly one-third of the PCE
presence and represent a considerable addition, both in
voting power in the Cortes and in campaign support, to the
5 8Socialists. In another instance, shortly after the PSOE-
PSP reunification was formalized, Felipe Gonzalez announced
that he intended to recommend that the PSOE remove the word
"Marxist" from its party definition. Apparently, the move
was part of a design to broaden the party's electoral base
by giving the PSOE a more Social-Democratic orientation,
thereby to entice elements from the center-right of the
political spectrum to the PSOE. Gonzalez declared, "the
electoral space on the PSOE ' s left is occupied by the PCE
59
and so it is on our right that our party can win votes."
The objective appears to be to divide the government party
58Madrid Radio, 9 April 1978, as reported in FBIS-WE,
10 April 1977, p. Nl.
59
Le Monde , 11 May 1978, p. 11, as reported in FBIS-WE,




in order to form a center-left alliance with its more
liberal elements.
Apparently, the announcement came as quite a surprise
to many in the PSOE. The outcry from the more leftist PSP
and the party's Catalan federation was considerable, they
being staunchly Marxist-Socialist in outlook. Consequently,
the PSOE at this point is again somewhat factionated,
posing possibilities for both PCE and UDC inroads into its
electoral constituencies.
The second development complicating the PCE ' s political
maneuverings is the consolidation of the UCD from a federa-
tion of small center-right parties into a unified entity.
During the past year, all of the UCD-affiliated parties
dropped their independent organizational structures to
unite under Suarez ' leadership in a single party. A unified
party platform, ideology and outlook is in the process of
being formulated and will be presented for ratification at
ft o
the party's first congress to be held in the near future.
As the center-right appears to be gaining strength in unity,
it may also prove to be more attractive to Spanish voters.
Consequently, while this development in many respects may
pose more difficulties for the PSOE than to the PCE, it
nonetheless further reduces the PCE ' s prospects for
influencing the opinions of prospective voters.
60Madrid Radio, 22 March 1978, as reported in FBIS-WE,
23 March 1978, p. N5.
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H. WHERE DOES THE PCE STAND?
One of the more important tasks facing the PCE has been
to gain respectability among the Spanish electorate as a
responsible, constructive and forward-looking political
alternative to the other political blocs. In order to
accomplish this task the PCE has embarked upon a two-
pronged strategy of conciliatory, non-violent political
agitation coupled with a progressive policy stance concerning
vital issues which face Spain today or which will present
themselves in the near future. Carrillo alluded to this
strategy early in 1977:
. . .we know we cannot gain a majority in the
elections and that we will not be among
the majority parties. We are not fighting
for ministerial positions; we are fighting
for a free and democratic Spain. We are,
of course, also fighting for socialism, but
that is our more long term battle. Our
path to socialism will be a long one just
as the socialism for which we are fighting
will be different from those kinds we have
experienced so far."-1-
Following is a survey of the PCE ' s stance on a number
of important issues as presented by Santiago Carrillo on
various occasions:
1. Democracy in Spain
In the short term we want a fully democratic
regime, in which all political parties, all
philosophic currents, all cultural currents,
can express themselves and in which the
TANJUG , 2 January 1977, "Carrillo Recounts Arrest,




workers have the right to organize them-
selves and defend their interests without
repression and persecution. After, in the
long term we want to start the process of
structural economic change. 6
2
We believe the King should continue as head
of state until a constituent assembly makes
a final decision. If its majority approves
of a monarchy for democratic Spain, we will
accept that decision although, quite frankly,
we prefer a republic.
"
. . .we are ready to get out (of a coalition
government) if we lose elections — just
like any other party. When I speak of
democracy I mean Western democracy, I
consider universal suffrage the criterion. 64
I believe in parliamentary democracy and I
believe that what this country needs is a
parliamentary democracy. 65
If we have to have a coalition to get a
completely democratic constitution and to
develop a recovery plan and to clean up the
Spanish economy in a progressive sense, I
personally will have no objection to coop-
erating with Prime Minister Suarez or with
anyone else who would share that aim ... I
have no phobias against anybody. I would
collaborate with anyone who is prepared to
carry out the sort of program I have described. 66
62Carrillo interview with New York Times , 16 January
1977, p. 3.
6 3
Radio Independent Spain, 12 October 1976, as reported
in FBIS-WE, 15 October 1976, p. N3
.
64
C.L. Sulzberger, "Certainly Not Another Franco — But
Not Another Lenin Either", New York Times , 7 August 1976,
p. 19.
BBC Domestic Television Service, 10 June 1977, as
reported in FBIS-WE, 13 June 1977, p. N3
.
66 Ibid., p. N4.
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Communism is compatible with democratic
monarchy . . . Spanish society has little
reason to question the democratic vocation
of the Communist Party, simply because we
Communists have spent many years fighting
to achieve democracy. ^7
The Economy
We are for a political economy that will
eliminate the corruption characteristic
of the Francoist system. Today in Spain
those who pay are the workers. After a
certain point of wealth, no one pays taxes:
this is a scandal. ^8
We are watching closely the economic crisis
developing in our country. We are changing
from a fascist dictatorship to a democracy.
In view of this situation we do not want to
confuse the economy of our country even more.
We want to create a more stable economy than
there is today. So we do not think this
would be the proper moment for nationalization
We subscribe to the Moncloa Pacts (a two-




drafting and defended them — indeed to
the point of often risking unpopularity more
than the government itself — because we
believe that, in view of the way in which
change has come about, it will be impossible
for the country to advance in any way other
than through a policy of concerted action and
consensus . ' °
69
67Madrid Radio, 11 May 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE,
12 May 1977, p. N3.
6 8Carrillo interview with New York Times , 16 January
1977, p. 3.
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Per Spiegel , 24 January 1977, "Carrillo Assesses
Democratization in Spain", as reported in JPRS , 19 February
1977.
70Madrid Domestic Service, 6 April 1978, as reported in
FBIS-WE, 7 April 1978, p. Nl.
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3. Spanish Membership in EEC
We are in favor of the entry of Spain into
the EEC, and we are in favor of the
building of a European economic and
political union. 71
4. U.S. Bases in Spain
We are for the American bases in Spain as
long as an accord is not reached that dis-
mantles the military bases — American and
Soviet — in the whole of Europe. ^2
...there should be no foreign military bases
on Spanish soil because only Spain should
occupy its territory. However, the exis-
tence of U.S. military bases in Spain serves
as a strategic balancing force. The PCE
accepts the presence of U.S. military bases
in Spain until the time all other military
bases in the Eastern and Western blocks in
Europe are eliminated . 7 3
5. Spanish Membership in NATO
We think that, above all, NATO is an enormous
bureaucracy that tries to perpetuate itself.
And it seems that for the Warsaw Pact it is
the same thing . . . Because in alliances like
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, inevitably, the
strongest power is hegemonic and that irri-
tates — it ends up turning the opinion of
the other countries against the power that
plays that role. So I, who accept American
bases in Spain, don't think it would be useful
for Spain to enter NATO. If the Spanish
Parliament votes entry into NATO, we obviously
will accept it.^4
71Camllo interview with New York Times , 16 January
1977, p. 3.
Ibid.
73Madrid EFE, 20 May 1977, "Carrillo Interviewed on
Eurocommunism, US Bases", as reported in FBIS-WE, 24 May
1977, p. N4.





(Spanish Communists) condemn energetically
all violations of liberty and democracy . .
.
wherever they occur . . . even if these regimes
profess socialist ideals. 75
7. The Monarchy
I must confess that I have done everything
possible, everything within power, to prevent
the establishment of the monarchy in this
country. However, I must recognize today
that the present monarchy is not what the old
regime was aiming for ... I cannot ignore this
reality ... I am a republican, I am a communist
But what I can say is that I do not see any
drawback to the king contributing to the change
from dictatorship to democracy. And there is
no reason why my party should not act within a
constitutional monarchy so long as the king
reigns but does not govern, so long as only the
people will govern. 7°
If the monarchy plays a positive role for the
stability of democracy in my country, I would
accept it. This is the case today.''
8. The Catholic Church
(PCE/Church relations) are characterized by
dialog. It is inevitable that the Church as
an institution should intervene in the prob-
lems of society. Our wish is, as far as possi-
ble, to seek a field of cooperation with that
social reality which the Church is. We are
striving and will continue to strive to achieve
this, in order to surmount ... the historical
75Paris AFP, 3 March 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE,
4 March 1977, p. N4
.
BBC Domestic Television Service, 10 June 1977, "PCE's
Carrillo Interviewed on General Elections", as reported in
FBIS-WE, 13 June 1977, p. N2
.
77Ya, 14 July 1977, pp. 5-6, "Santiago Carrillo'
s
•Confessions'", as reported in FBIS-WE, 17 July 1977.
83

confrontation between the progressive move-
ments and the Church. Since the Church
has accepted political pluralism, that kind
of relationship of cooperation and respect
is possible. 78
7 8
El Pais , 22 January 1978, pp. 10-12, Interview with




IV. THE PCE AND EUROCOMMUNISM
The Spanish Civil War marked a significant period in
the history of the PCE. If the Republican side had been
victorious, it is highly probable that the PCE would have
had a significant, if not controlling, influence in the
resulting government of Spain. Indeed some observers sug-
gest that a major reason for the Soviet Union's withdrawal
of military aid to the Republic in 1938 was due to the
Soviet's fear that successful revolution outside of Russia
would diminish Soviet dominance of the international communist
movement.
In part due to the highly effective repressive measures
of the Franco regime and in part due to the exiled Republi-
cans' exclusion of the PCE from opposition efforts, the PCE
was forced by circumstances to evolve under the wing of the
CPSU. Therefore, the story of the PCE during the 1940 's
and 1950 's was one of close association with the policies
of the Soviet Union.
Until 1945 the Soviet model of communism held complete
sway among world communist parties. However, the installa-
tion of communist puppet regimes in Eastern Europe under
the specter of Soviet military presence, rather than in-
creasing the dominance of the Soviet model, in reality marked
the beginning of the gradual dissolution of Soviet hegemony
among world communist parties. Just as other parties have
been re-examining Soviet-style Marixism-Leninism through
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the years, the PCE has also been reappraising its relation-
ship to the CPSU.
The result of the transformation of communism has been
titled at various junctures as Titoism, national communism,
polycentrism, and most recently, Eurocommunism. Through
the years of transformation, the PCE has evolved from a
staunch Soviet supporter to a vehement Soviet antagonist.
This section will first view the evolution of inter-
national communism from 1945 to the present in general
terms to show the effect of certain events and developments
upon the changing character of the PCE and its evolution
into probably the most ardent proponent of the phenomenon
of Eurocommunism.
A. THE STALIN YEARS - STAGNATION
During the 1945 to 1948 time period the Soviet Union
progressively consolidated its control in Eastern Europe.
A popular front program soon resulted in the installation
of pro-Moscow communist parties in power in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany. The
Sovietization and Stalinization of Eastern Europe followed
quickly as the Soviet Union exploited the region economically
to rebuild its own devastated economy. Moscow, bolstered by
the presence of the Red Army, turned the region into a belt
of cowed and compliant satellites. It was not until the
Czech Coup of 1948 that the West finally became convinced
of the realities of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.
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Similar expansion of communist influence was taking
place in Western Europe as the PCF and PCI also employed
popular front tactics to gain strength in numbers and influ-
ence. Several PCF members, including Maurice Thorez, PCF
Secretary-General, were ministers of post-war French
governments. Thorez even ran for the Presidency of the
Provisional Government in the November 1946 elections.
In Italy Togliatti capitalized upon the respect the PCI
had gained among the populace for its resistence activities
to expand Communist political influence. Under Togliatti
the PCI supported the royal government and aligned itself
with the Badoglio cabinet. By the end of World War II the
PCI was the second largest political party in Italy and
became an important member of the first post-war government,
until excluded by Alcide de Gasperi in 1947. Quite in
harmony with Soviet urgings and the French and Italian exam-
ples, the PCE also returned to using the popular front
tactic. However, unlike in immediate post-war France and
Italy, the PCE's call for unity of all forces opposed to
2the Franco regime was to remain unanswered until 1974.
For a review of the historical development of the
French Left see: Mary E. Walsh, "The French Left and Defense
Policy", Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1977.
2For a review of the historical development of the PCI
see Richard E. Coe, "The Two Faces of Italian Communism:
The Seizure of Power by Tactics of Accommodation and the
Calculated Destruction of Liberal Democracy by Revolutionary




The 1947 critique and 1948 expulsion of Yugoslavia from
the Cominforra heightened internal squabbling among the
various groups competing for leadership of the PCE. The
PCE press, like those of all pro-Soviet parties, was replete
with denunciations of "Titoite bandits" and scores of
3
expulsions and schisms took place within the PCE. Jesus
Monzon, a leader of PCE elements in the Spanish interior,
was one of those denounced. The demoralizing effect on the
militants in Spain of seeing their leaders denounced as
4traitors and provocateurs was quite evident. Meanwhile,
the "correct" PCE revered Stalin with no less religious
adoration than the rest of the pro-Soviet parties.
In foreign policy matters also, the PCE strongly supported
Soviet positions. In fact, the dispute between the exiled
leadership and the clandestine leadership described in an
earlier chapter was just one of many episodes of the early
Cold War years which indicated that the exiled PCE was less
interested in fighting the Franco regime than in promoting
Soviet foreign policy. As a consequence, by 1950 the PCE,
with its leadership in Moscow owing their positions and
physical support to the Kremlin, had become firmly wedded to
the CPSU. 5
3Hermet, p. 56.




However, two developments were soon to reverse the
retreat to the East. One was the growing weakness of the
Franco regime in 1950-52 which allowed the party to reinforce
and strengthen its cells within Spain and to increase con-
tacts with other groups in the Spanish underground. From
1953 on, despite some setbacks, the PCE was to continue
to gain influence in the anti-Franco underground and to
eventually infiltrate several of the officially permitted
labor syndicates. The growing importance of underground
leaders coupled with the desire of the leadership in exile
to maintain control over party activities necessitated the
return of party headquarters closer to activities in Spain.
The second factor which began to impel the PCE away from
Moscow was the de-Stalinization of 1953-56. By October of
1954 the PCE announced a policy of reinstating unjustly
expelled members of the anti-Tito era and by 1956 the "errors"
of the Stalinist cult of personality were officially put
to an end at a meeting of the augmented plenum of the PCE
7Central Committee. The entire process echoed completely
the line put forth by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress
of the CPSU. As Leonard suggests, the majority of communists,
including the PCE, welcomed the events of the 20th Party
Congress.






To them the criticism of Stalin and the
proclamation of new concepts meant that
the past could be totally abandoned and
new roads embarked upon, roads leading
toward the democratization of the communist
parties, toward freeing themselves from
lies, and toward an open discussion on
all subjects.
^
B. THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS - THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE
As a result of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapproachment and
the Soviet recognition that there was more than one road
to socialism, the early Khrushchev years were to become
years of searching for new models for the attaining of
socialism by the various communist parties. In June of
1956 a Polish workers' uprising in Poznan showed the need
for internal reform which Soviet leadership was unable to
squelch. When the nationalist communist, Gomulka, was
installed in October it appeared that it was safe to continue
9the reform course in Poland.
Taking inspiration from the Polish developments, the
reformist followers of Imre Nagy in Hungary demonstrated
in Budapest on 23 October, demanding independence, democrati-
zation, freedom of the press, withdrawal of Soviet troops
and the reappointment of Nagy to the premiership which he
had held in 19 53. The demonstrators were fired upon by
Soviet troops, whereupon the formerly peaceful demonstration
gWolfgang Leonard, Three Faces of Marxism
,
(NY: Holt,
1970) , p. 274.
9 Ibid., p. 278.
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turned into a full-blown revolution. By October 30 a
coalition government under Nagy was set up and Hungary
appeared to be embarking upon an independent program of
social democracy. However, as Leonard points out, "The
Soviet invasion of November 4, 1956, the brutal crushing
of the Hungarian Revolution and the subsequent arrest of
the leading Hungarian reformers, including Imre Nagy, meant
that the breakthrough toward socialist democracy in Hungary
had been, at least for the time being, drowned in blood."
It was also in 1956 that Togliatti of the PCI coined
the word "polycentrism" to describe the notion that differ-
ent countries should follow different roads to socialism,
that they should tailor their tactics to national contexts
and that the Soviet model should no longer be obligatory.
Polycentrism delineated the two diverging themes of inter-
national communism. On one hand was the Soviet desire for
leadership and hegemony over the movement expressed to the
point of forced subordination of restive factions. On the
other hand was the growing strength of independent, national
communist movements refusing, with varying intensity, to
subordinate themselves to politics inspired by specifically
Russian conditions. The all-important controlling factor
became the presence of Soviet troops.
10 Ibid., p. 286.
Robert A. Wohl, "Palmiro Togliatti: Italian Master of
Maneuver", in Roger Swearington, ed., Leaders of the Communist
World, (NY: Free Press, 1971), p. 29.
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The PCE opted for the independent road. In 1956 the
PCE firmly announced its policy of "National Reconciliation"
,
that is, the PCE was ready and willing to conclude pacts,
agreements and alliances with all political groups, Falangist,
Catholics, and Socialists alike, in order to oppose the Franco
12
regime by peaceful means. However, due to the previous
close relationship of the PCE with Soviet policy and the
obvious example of Soviet intentions provided by the crushing
of the Hungarian resistance, PCE pronouncements were not
taken seriously by other anti-Franco groups.
Probably another factor contributing to the PCE's enuncia-
tion of the national reconciliation policy was the regained
strength which the Franco regime was exhibiting following its
1953 military pact with the U.S., its Concordat with the Vatican
and its 1955 election to United Nations membership. Therefore,
both the realities of communist party relations and the
Spanish domestic scene necessitated a "peaceful road"
.
In accordance with its policy of national reconciliation,
from 1956 to 1960 the PCE expounded the virtues of "peaceful
national strikes." The "Day of National Reconciliation" of
5 May 1958 and the "Peaceful National Strike" of 18 June 1959
were signal attempts to implement this policy. However, in
spite of glowing PCE praise for their success, the strikes
could be more accurately described as total failures. Lack








It was also during these years that Carrillo maneuvered
to gain control of the party. Despite his strong connection
with the policy of national reconciliation and the failure of
the 1958 and 1959 strikes , Carrillo managed to become elected
Secretary-General at the 6th PCE Party Congress in Prague
in 1960. He was also able to paralyze his adversaries by
replacing the previous governing Political Bureau with an
Executive Committee largely composed of his supporters and
to have former Secretary-General Dolores Ibarruri elevated
14
to the purely honorary post of President of the Party.
After 1960/ closely reflecting Carrillo 's views, the
party program stressed the need for closer links with the
middle class. Increased efforts were expended to cultivate
support among the non-monopoly bourgeoisie, students and
intellectuals and Catholics. " The party was also able to
consolidate its gains in the syndical unions through in-
creasing control of underground workers' commissions. These
organizations have contributed greatly to the growing PCE
influence in Spanish politics. However, even though expan
sion of recruitment efforts was to increase party membership
and influence, events were soon to take place that would









After 1956, Sino-Soviet enmity increased rapidly, precipi-
tating the final break in 1963. However, when considered in
the backdrop of traditional Sino-Soviet rivalries, the
polemics of this period were merely the final stages of the
realization by the Chinese of a developing distinction between
what could be termed the "Soviet" and the "Chinese" roads.
Among other ideas, the Chinese attacked the Soviet line on
the concept of the non-inevitability of wars, the possibility
of peaceful coexistence, and Moscow's concept of the unity
16
of the world communist movement. Ultimately, however,
the Sino-Soviet split had as its basis the Chinese desire
for independence and autonomy from the CPSU.
The conflicting tenets of the Chinese and Soviet models
quickly effected the students and intellectuals which the
PCE had successfully recruited to the party ranks during the
late 1950 's and early 1960 's and soon provoked a serious
challenge to party unity. As a result of PCE support for
Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in opposition to
Carrillo's "moderate" line, the Madrid students organization
17broke away from the PCE in 1963. This group soon developed
its own splinter factions which alternately split and coalesced
with other disenchanted elements of the PCE. By October 1964
however, three of these groups, the self-styled "Communist
Party of Spain", "Proletaria" , and the "Communist Revolu-






18(Marxist-Leninist) . This group and other radical left
groups which have sprung up since 1967 have provided strong
competition to the PCE ' s recruitment effort among Spanish
students and intellectuals.
At this time Carrillo also came under attack from the
party right. In 1964 Fernando Claudin and Jorge Semprun
were expelled from the Executive Committee for criticizing
the party's non-recognition of the changes that had occurred
in Spanish society during the 1950 's. They demanded that
the party abandon its belief in the imminent downfall of
the regime and recognize that a long-term strategy was
19
needed to gain the revolution.
Chinese views on independence and autonomy also appar-
ently had some effect in changing PCE views on the subject.
Probably the success of the Chinese ' departure compounded
developing PCE ideas of independent party action resulting
from the Khrushchev years and were buoyed by the examples
of Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania. Consequently, 1964
marked the hesitant beginning of PCE non-conformity with
CPSU views. Even though the PCE officially supported the
ouster of Khrushchev, party pronouncements became increasingly
vocal in embracing the principle of autonomy for each party
within the international communist movement.
Willenz and Uliassi take note of the change in the character oJ
the PCE and other Western European communist parties after 1964:
18Eric Willenz and Pio Uliassi, "Western Europe" in
Leopold Labedz , ed., International Communism After Khrushchev ,




The Sino-Soviet dispute has not seriously
weakened the West European communist parties,
but it has involved their leaders in a half-
hearted defiance of Moscow which became
more pronounced after Khrushchev's fall. It
led most European communists to reaffirm
publicly their support for the basic poli-
cies of the deposed leader -- if only to
warn the new Soviet leaders against radical
changes in policy. This effort to commit
Khrushchev's successors to positions favored
by the Western parties was unprecedented,
as was their equally emphatic and almost
universal criticism of the manner of
Khrushchev's removal. These developments
illustrate the rapidly changing relationship
between Moscow and the West European parties.
Their position may be characterized as con-
tinued opposition to the principal ideological
arguments of Peking combined with an in-
creasing unwillingness to accept subordination
to Moscow. 2 ^
They continue by pointing out the serious implications to
small parties such as the PCE of such a change in policy:
It should be noted that the smaller communist
parties have generally been more seriously
affected by the Sino-Soviet dispute than the
larger ones, mainly, perhaps, because their
organizations are more vulnerable to attacks
from militant minorities. The three pro-
scribed parties -- Portuguese, Spanish, and
West German — stand as a special case of
small-party vulnerability. Since their leaders
are safely domiciled in Moscow (or elsewhere
in Eastern Europe) , there is the danger of
a breakdown of communications between militants
within a country, working at times under con-
ditions of extreme danger and deprivation (as
in Portugal and Spain) , and exiled leaders
who, in counselling patience and moderation,
seem to the militants to have lost touch
with political realities.
20







Despite the implications/ the PCE had taken the risk and
made the move toward independence. After 1965 the PCE
increased its associations with the PCI, the Communist Party
of Romania (PCP) and the Yugoslav League of Communists
(LCY) . By 1966 the PCE described themselves as being in
sole charge of Spain's march toward socialism.
C. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - THE BREAKING POINT
By early 1968 the confluence of the independence trend
forced by the student breakaway and the reassessment of
the revolutionary situation in Spain forced by the Claudin
faction was to lead the PCE to the position of voicing pro-
found sympathy for the processes taking place in Czechoslo-
vakia under Dubcek and to force a PCE decision which has
marked the party's character ever since.
The August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
marked the real turning point in the PCE ' s attitude toward
the CPSU. Just prior to the invasion the PCE had emphasized
its endorsement of Dubcek s new course, and on August 21,
the day of the invasion itself, Dolores Ibarruri and Carrillo,
accompanied by Pajetta and Longo of the PCI, personally
voiced their opposition to Mikhail Suslov, Soviet Politburo
member, in Moscow. He dismissed their protests out of hand,
declaring to Carrillo, "After all, you represent only a
small party. "22 a subsequent attempt to solve the problem
22Mujal-Leon, p. 44, quoting K.S. Karol recount of




by a compromise failed and in September a plenum of the
PCE Central Committee voted 66 to 5 to condemn the invasion,
embarking the PCE upon a policy of open, public and vocal
24
opposition to the Soviet action.
It should be noted that in light of the opposition of
other Western European communist parties to the Soviet
action and the PCE ' s growing commitment to democratic social-
ism, the PCE could do no less. It should also be noted
that in contrast to the PCF, which shortly reverted to
supporting the invasion, and to the PCI, which soon softened
its opposition, the PCE has remained staunchly critical
of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia to the present day.
However, the policy was destined to exacerbate internal
PCE quarrels. Subsequently, the exit of Garcia, and Gomez
in 1969 and Lister in 1970 to form the rival, pro-Soviet
PCOE has provided a ready-made haven for anti-Carrillo
forces. That Carrillo maintained control of the PCE in
spite of this serious schism goes a long way toward explaining
25
his continued vocal anti-Soviet proclamations.
Moreover, Carrillo' s successful opposition to the CPSU
put a serious dent in the CPSU ideological armor which other
West European communist parties were quick to note, but have
2 %bid., p. 57.
2




nevertheless, been prudently slow to exploit. Therefore,
PCE anti-Sovietism has combined with existing polycentric
tendencies in international communism to become an important
aspect of the' PCE's evolution to its present Eurocommunist
stance. To be sure, other West European communist parties
have been warily reluctant to fully accept the PCE's anti-
Soviet tenet in defining Eurocommunism, but they have none-
theless been drawn inexorably to that position. Good exam-
ples are provided by the changing character of the PCI and
PCF through the years.
Willenz and Uliassi provide a good description of the
PCI pursuit of autonomy after 1963:
Years before the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted,
Italian communists were struggling to win
greater autonomy for their party (they became
more explicit and insistent in pursuing this
goal after 19 56) , to develop their own strategy
of power, and (more important) to 'domesticate'
their political objectives. They were obviously
intent on traveling their own road to social-
ism, but at the same time they wished to avoid
disruptive conflicts with the USSR, since
the Soviet revolutionary myth was and still
is an important source of authority within
the party and a factor in its appeal to mem-
bers and voters. The Sino-Soviet dispute
has forced a quickening of the PCI ' s evolu-
tionary pace. It has, of course, enabled
the party to assert its independence more
vigorously and safely than it might otherwise
have done; and it has permitted -- even
compelled -- the PCI to move more rapidly
and freely in search of its distinctive
identity .2 6
26
Willenz and Uliassi, p. 50.
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The publication of Togliatti's "testament" in 1964 raised
grave doubts within the party as to the validity of the
Soviet model. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia com-
pounded these doubts and caused serious intra-party dis-
cussion of how strictly the party should adhere to Moscow's
international leadership. The continued success of the PCI
at the polls through the years has enhanced the PCI ' s power
in Italian politics. Soviet attempts to arrest this trend,
including cutbacks on financial assistance, have been gen-
erally unsuccessful and possibly counterproductive. For
example/ the PCI led a number of West European communist
parties to insure that the 1976 East Berlin Conference of
European Communist and Workers Parties emphasized the inde-
pendence of national parties rather than Soviet leadership
of the international movement.
The PCF transformation is rather analagous, but the French
Party has been a relative latecomer to the West European
anti-Soviet fold, and it remains reluctant to completely
sever the bonds. The PCF has long been proud of its image
as the most Stalinist of West European parties and it has
maintained strong support of the Soviet Union. The zig-zag
course which the PCF followed from 1934 to 1962 showed its
readiness to identify completely with Soviet foreign policy
objectives. In fact, the first time that the PCF publicly
criticised the CPSU was on the occasion of the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia. However, the criticism was immediately
softened and the PCF became the first West European communist
100

27party to send a delegation to Moscow to renew ties.
The PCF also supported the PCP during the Portuguese revo-
lution of 1974 and has maintained its support while other
West European communist parties have found Cunhal's policy
pronouncements and avowedly Stalinist pro-Sovietism to be
distasteful.
Thorez ' death in 1964 eased the way toward a liberali-
zation of the PCF ' s domestic policy so that by 1970 it
was turning more and more toward the building of a mass
party. The election gains of the left in the 1970' s as a
result of the PCF-Socialist Common Program accelerated this
trend. Consequently, when preparations for the East Berlin
Conference indicated that Soviet-inspired proposals would
have the effect of limiting the PCF ' s freedom to develop
domestic policy to fit national requirements, the PCF switched
from strongly backing the Soviet proposals to opposing them
at the side of Italian-Spanish-Romanian autonomists. More
recently, Georges Marchais, PCF Secretary-General, did not
attend the 25th Congress of the CPSU but sent a representative
instead. Consequently, while the PCF of today still cannot
be characterized as anti-Soviet, it certainly cannot be
considered as entirely pro-Soviet either. Given the back-
ground of the PCF, this change is significant.
27 Ronald Tiersky, French Communism
,
(NY: Columbia
University Press, 1974), p. 290.
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D. THE EMERGENCE OF EUROCOMMUNISM
Soviet frustration with its inability to muzzle the
PCE and control other West European communist parties has
been exacerbated by implications of two recent conferences,
the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) and the 197 6 Conference of European Communist
Parties. The Soviet acceptance of the so-called "Basket
III" provisions of the Helsinki agreement has provided
disaffected communist parties with a document to support
critical views of the disparity between the Soviet model of
socialism and its actual treatment of individuals. Although
the Soviets have attempted to "stonewall" on their implemen-
tation of Basket III human rights provisions, most recently
at the first compliance review in Belgrade, their obstruc-
tions have only served to increase criticism of Soviet human
rights violations from East as well as West European
communist parties.
The preparations for the 1976 East Berlin Conference of
European Communist and Workers Parties have been well docu-
28
mented and analyzed by Kevin Devlin. He describes the
outcome of the conference as a decided victory for the
"nationalist" communist parties. By joining forces, the
PCI, PCF and PCE plus the Romanian (PCR) and Yugoslavian
(LCY) parties gained concessions on all important issues.
28
See: Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism",
Problems of Communism , January/February 1977, pp. 1-20, and




According to Devlin, the final document produced by the
conference was a "lowest-common-denominator text based on
the new principle of consensus, itself a formal recognition
of the equality and autonomy of all communist parties; it
contained no criticism of the Chinese and no praise of the
Soviets' it dealt with political action and not with ideology;
and it was not binding upon the participants (in fact, it
29
was not even signed by any of them) .
"
The PCE played an instrumental role in determining the
content and character of this document. As a member of
the eight-party subgroup (four independent parties: LCY,
PCR, PCI and PCE, and four loyalist parties: CPSU, PCF,
East German and Danish) which drafted the document, the PCE
was in the forefront of those opposing CPSU attempts to
30
control its content. In this position the PCE was able
to rebuff Soviet attempts to erect a facade to give a false
• * ,_ • 31impression of unanimity of the participating parties.
The confrontation over the conference document served
to consolidate a convergence of ideas among the Western
communist parties. Based on the PCF ' s about-face regarding
support of the CPSU, a strategic alliance of the PCE, PCI,
and PCF emerged. The alliance was formalized by the adoption
29










of bilateral communiques proclaiming the parties' commit-
ment to pluralistic and libertarian ideals. Devlin suggests
that the PCI-PCF statement of November 197 5 could be con-
sidered the "Manifesto of Eurocommunism" although the PCE
would probably argue the point based upon a similar PCE-PCI
statement issued earlier, in July 1975. Devlin observed
that the PCI-PCF statement
committed the two communist parties to
'support for the plurality of political
parties, for the right to existence and
activity of opposition parties, and for
democratic alternation between the majority
and the minority. ' The eventual building of
a socialist order in Italy and France would
be characterized by 'a continued democrati-
zation of economic, social and political
life,' while existing bourgeois liberties
would be 'guaranteed and developed.' The
statement went on: 'This goes for freedom
of thought and expression, of the press,
of assembly and association, of demonstration,
for free circulation of persons at home and
abroad, for inviolability of private life,
for religious freedom. ' It also pledged
'complete freedom for all currents of
philosophical, cultural, and artistic opinion. 1
Within a regional and not merely national
context, the two parties vowed to promote
' the common action of the Communist and
Socialist parties, of all the democratic ^nd
progressive forces of (Western) Europe.'
The East Berlin Conference effectively marked the emer-
gence of Eurocommunism, and the PCE played an important
role in the shaping of its character. In view of the






discussed, Carrillo wished to further unify the policies
of the three most important West European communist parties.
Toward this end he called the so-called "Eurocommunist Summit"
in Madrid in March 1977. One of the results of this meeting
was that the participants came away calling themselves Euro-
communists. However, before discussing the other outcomes
of this meeting, it would be useful to mention some distinc-
tive elements of Eurocommunism as they are viewed by the
three West European communist parties.
Since 197 5 the term "Eurocommunism" has become very
popularly used. It was apparently a word invented by an
Italian journalist in 1975 to contrast the PCI's form of
communism, operating within the traditional Western politi-
cal framework, with the Soviet model, operating under the
concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" — a sort
of extension of the concept of "communism with a human face"
to the concept of "communism with a democratic face."
Since then, the term has become a catch-all, meaning differ-
ent things to different people.
Unfortunately, the concept which the term is intended
to describe is also somewhat nebulous. As perceived by
this writer, and as indicated by prior discussion in this
study, Eurocommunism can be considered as the most recent
extension of the ongoing world-wide communist re-examination
of various tenets of Marxism-Leninism and particularly of
the position which the CPSU should hold in the international
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communist movement. This re-examination could be considered
to have begun at the time of the imposition of National
Front governments in Soviet occupied Eastern Europe in
1945. Before then, the Soviet model was universally revered
and strictly followed. Since then, national communist par-
ties have been moving progressively away from the Soviet
fold. On occasion, such as the Yugoslav case, the process
has been swift and cataclysmic/ on other occasions/ as with
Romania (and to a lesser extent other East European nations)
the process has been very gradual and sometimes fraught
with setbacks, such as in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia
in 1968. A unique aspect of the generally growing indepen-
dence of communist parties from Soviet influence has been
the evolution of the parties of Western Europe. It is the
emergent ideology of these communist parties to which this
writer applies the term "Eurocommunism."
Therefore, under the West European ideology/ Eurocommunism
seeks to transform several basic tenets of Soviet-style
communism. One is the rejection of "proletarian internation-
alism". As the previous discussion has pointed out/ the
gradual defiance of the international authority of the Soviet
Union in communist affairs has been the foundation of the
evolution toward Eurocommunism. However/ this rejection has
not been complete nor universal, making it a bone of conten-
tion among the Western European communist parties themselves.
For example, while the PCE rejects Soviet hegemony vehemently/
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the PCI has been more sophisticated and ambivalent in its
choosing of words of opposition, and the PCF has been even
more circumspect in its pronouncements.
The remaining two Marxist-Leninist tenets which Euro-
communism desires to transform are "the dictatorship of the
proletariat" and "democratic centralism" . A short discussion
of the evolution of the three Eurocommunist parties to
their present positions will serve to compare and contrast
the PCE's position on these tenets with those of the PCI
and PCF.
All three parties now reject the tenet of "the dictator-
ship of the proletariat" . In fact the PCI has never made
use of the slogan and has not even mentioned it since be-
coming a force in Italian politics after World War II. In
contrast, other Western parties originally enshrined the
concept in their statutes and programs, but have since
33gradually dropped the notion. Undoubtedly, they were
discovering individually that for any party which had aban-
doned the project of seizing revolutionary power by itself,
the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat was a
considerable handicap. No other party would consent to
collaborate with it for the peaceful conquest of power at









The PCF, while stubbornly refusing to repudiate the
slogan until 1974, gradually stopped using it between
1964-1968. By 1972 Marchais was saying, in the process of
urging the "Union de le Gauche", that the party no longer
spoke of the concept in traditional terms, but rather,
referred to it as a broad form of democracy for workers
and the mass of the people. In 1976 Marchais announced
casually, in a TV interview, that the phrase would be ex-
35punged from the party statutes.
In contrast to the PCF ' s foot dragging, the PCE, a
clandestine party with little necessity for consulting the
membership, abruptly dropped the phrase in 1968, declaring
that one-party rule was a deformation of Marxism good enough
for backward countries, but unsuited to modern conditions.
By 1976, the justification for renunciation was that the
dictatorship of the proletariat had been a Stalinist doc-
trine; consequently, the PCE linked its abandonment to the
party's condemnation of one-party rule in East Europe. More
recently, Carrillo explained at a press conference that it
was not valid to do away with the concept of the dictatorship
of the proletariat in all countries, but only in advanced










involves the idea of socialist forces achieving power
37
democratically.
The third tenet of traditional communist ideology which
is in jeopardy is "democratic centralism". In contrast
to the previous two tenets, which have been largely
repudiated, the doctrine of democratic centralism has not
been overtly rejected by the Western communist parties.
However, it does appear to be coming increasingly under
attack as the parties attempt to deal with the problems of
controlling a mass party while publicly professing a demo-
cratic character.
The impediments to effecting change of a party structure
that is based on absolute centralization and rigorous
discipline are well stated by Neil Mclnnes in Eurocommunism :
The Leninist party machine is prized by
the leaders like the apple of the eye,
while the fact that the parties continue
to recruit tens of thousands of Europeans
each year shows that it is attractive, at
least for a time, to many of the led. It
would be natural for the incumbent leaders
to cling to a structure that gives them
their present social position and political
eminence, and promises to carry them to
the highest offices of the state. It would
be normal, too, for them and their aspirant
successors to defend a structure that pro-
vides a unique means of intervening in
western political life, that magnifies a
group's influence far beyond its numbers,
and that brings with it the advantages -
moral and material - of representing a world
37
Madrid Radio report of Carrillo press conference,
25 May 197/, as reported in FBIS-WE, 26 May 1977, p. N2.
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superpower on the local scene. Finally,
members and voters who come to politics in
a romantic or conspiratorial mood, or who
come to communism disappointed with the
futility of Latin socialist parties, relish
the discipline and blind devotion the
machine asks of them. 8
Despite the probable desires of the leadership to
oppose loosening of their controls over their respective
parties, there has been some limited evolution in this
area. Mclnnes credits the PCI with having the freest
internal democracy, "yet it has evolved less on this point
than on any other since Togliatti set his stamp on it after
39
the war." He continues to point out that PCI democrati-
zation has been limited to a few acknowledged spokesmen
who elucidate the "correnti" which they lead within the
party. One also occasionally hears rumors of debates within
the Central Committee. Nonetheless, in the PCI, even today,
once the policy has been set at the top, further discussion
40
is not to be found.
Change in the PCF has been even more limited than in
the PCI. According to Mclnnes, "The PCF, boastful of its
Leninist rigidity, never even pretended to be liberalizing
party life until it became plain that its reputation for
orthodoxy was an electoral handicap to the Union de le
38
Mclnnes, " Faroeommunism"










Gauche. Thereupon, Marchais had the effrontery to declare
the PCF was 'the most liberal party in France'.
It is on the point of democratic centralism that the
PCE has apparently become the most daring and innovative
of any communist parties. All three Eurocommunist parties
express serious desires to come to power through democratic
methods and promise to abide by alternation of parties in
power, if elected and then turned out. But the PCE under
Carrillo's guiding hand has ostensibly gone so far as to
allow at least semi-open debate and secret balloting in
party affairs. In fact some critics of Carrillo claim he
is using Stalinist tactics to democratize the party at too
fast a rate. If this is true, the irony of the transfor-
mation process is highly intriguing.
In this respect the recent PCE 9th Party Congress, held
17-23 April 1978 produced an astonishing spectacle -- the
membership, after two days of open debate, voted to change
the description of the party from "Marxist-Leninist" to
"Marxist, democratic and revolutionary". The vote, 968
"For" to 248 "Against" with 40 abstentions, serves to
reinforce Carrillo's claim that the PCE, at least on the






"Democracy v. Authority", p. 32.
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"Spanish Reds Vote to Break with Soviet-style Line",
Monterey Peninsula Herald, 22 April 1977, p. 1.
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outcome also reaffirmed Carrillo's firm grasp of party
controls and indicates that the PCE will continue to develop
along the course he has set for it. An indication that
democratic centralism in the PCE will continue to be more
centralized than democratic was Carrillo's reply when he
was questioned at a post-congress press conference about
future discussion within the party. Carrillo said that
from now on debate within the party will continue , "but
not of course on Thesis 15 (which changed the party des-
cription) , which has already been approved." He added
that the conduct of the minority has shown that party unity
has not been undermined despite the fact that the former
monolithic form no longer exists. In sum, within the PCE
the outcome of the conflicting trends of democratization
and democratic centralism remains clouded and confused.
E. EUROCOMMUNISM A LA SANTIAGO CARRILLO
Since Santiago Carrillo is probably the most outspoken
proponent of Eurocommunism and his party apparently firmly
supports his leadership, some reference should be made to
what Carrillo himself thinks Eurocommunism to be. He put
forth his concept of Eurocommunism in his recent, best-
selling bock, Euroconmunism and the State. Following
4 4L'Unita , 26 April 1978, "Carrillo Illuminates PCE




are a few excerpts from his book which should suffice to
outline Carrillo's views.
The ' Eurocommunist ' phenomenon is not a
'tactical maneuver on the part of Moscow'
... It is an autonomous strategic con-
ception, in the process of formation/ born
of experience of those concerned and of
concrete reality . . . this strategy has not
been worked out with a view to 'extending
Soviet influence', nor in order to upset




there cannot be any confusion between
Eurocommunism and social democracy in the
ideological sphere . . . What is commonly
called 'Eurocommunism' proposes to transform
society, not to administer it; to work out
a socialist alternative to the system of
state monopoly capitalism, not to integrate
in it and become one of its governmental
variants.
...the Eurocommunist strategy aims to bring
about a convergence with the socialist and
social democratic parties . .
.
The parties included in the Eurocommunist
trend are agreed on the need to advance to
socialism with democracy, a multi-party sys-
tem, parliaments and representative insti-
tutions, sovereignty of the people regularly
exercised through universal suffrage, trade
unions independent of the state and of the
parties, freedom for the opposition, human
rights, religious freedom, freedom for cul-
ture, scientific and artistic creation and
development of the broadest forms of popular
participation at all levels and in all
branches of social activity . . . the parties
claim their total independence in relation
to any possible international leading center . . . J
"Eurocommunism and Social Democracy", The New Statesman ,
30 September 1978, pp. 434-437. Exerpts from Santiago
Carrillo, Eurocommuni smo y estado.
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Carrillo has consistently repeated his ideas in numer-
ous press conferences and interviews. In a recent one he
specified which "international leading center" he was
refering to in the excerpt above taken from his book. He
stated that Eurocommunism was "socialism running parallel
to democracy, freedom, with universal suffrage and alterna-
tion of parties in the government, independence of the
communist movements vis-a-vis the socialist state without
submitting itself to any international discipline and with-
46
out obeying orders from Moscow."
Obviously the other Eurocommunist parties, the PCI and
PCF, seem to be comfortable with most of the elements of
Carrillo' s concept and definition of Eurocommunism. The
PCI, operating under Togliatti's notion of polycentrism,
has espoused the virtues of the democratic political process
as a viable method to make the socialist revolution. The
PCF has been less public in its support, but has nonetheless
actively used the democratic political process to increase
its influence in French politics. The point of major dis-
agreement among the three parties seems to boil down to what
the proper degree of independence from the CPSU should be.
To settle this point was a major reason why Carrillo
called Marchais and Berlinguer to meet together with him in
46Ya, 14 July 1977, p. 5-6. Antonio Pelayo report on
Santiago Carrillo interview on French television, as




Madrid in March 1977 for a "Eurocommunist Summit". Even
though the three leaders reiterated statements that the
meeting should not be construed as a challenge to the
47
CPSU , it was a symbolic display of independence of the
three parties in view of the CPSU's earlier warnings to
the Japanese and other communist parties that none had the
right to organize a congress or regional meeting without
. .
48
inviting a Soviet delegation. However, after two days
of secret talks, the leaders issued a "Declaration of
Madrid" in which the independence of the parties was
affirmed, but which fell short of supporting Carrillo's
anti-Soviet position.
In the building of this new society, the
Spanish, Italian and French communists are
resolved to work within the pluralism of the
political and social forces and to respect
guarantees and develop all individual and
collective freedoms: freedom of thought and
of speech, of the press, of association and
meeting, of demonstration, of free circula-
tion of persons within the country and abroad,
trade union freedom, independence for the
trade unions, the right to strike, inviola-
bility of private life, respect for universal
suffrage, prospects for the democratic
alternative of the majorities, religious
freedom, cultural freedom, freedom of expression
for different trends of opinion, philosophical,
cultural and artistic.
This will to build socialism within democracy
and freedom inspires the concepts which have
47
James Goldsborough, "Eurocommunism After Madrid",






evolved in full independence by each of
the three parties. The three parties are
determined to continue to develop in the
future international solidarity and
friendship, on the basis of the indepen-
dence of each party, the equality of
rights, noninterference and respect for
the free choice of original solutions for
the building of socialist societies, which 4 g
correspond to the conditions in each country.
Therefore, even though Carrillo was not as successful
as he had hoped to be, he did accomplish two very important
tasks: 1) he gained public agreement from the other two
major West European communist parties upon the general con-
cept of Eurocommunism and, 2) he demonstrated that the PCE
intended to be the initiator of change in the international
communist movement. The events of the PCE * s 9th Party Con-
gress, already mentioned, serve to reinforce the second
point.
Such, then, is the overall concept of the society which
some hope Eurocommunism will create. However, Santiago
Carrillo appears to hope that it will do something extra
for him. That is, to strengthen his image as a world
leader in the communist movement. A short example should
suffice to indicate what may be on Carrillo' s mind: Carrillo
has often claimed that Moscow used to be viewed as the
"Vatican of the Communist Movement" , but that Eurocommunism
49Radio Independent Spain broadcast of text of final
communique issued after Madrid meeting, 3 May 1977, as
reported in FBIS-WE, 4 May 1977, pp. N1-N2.
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was the Communists' "Vatican II". When asked in a recent
interview where he envisioned the seat of this Vatican II
50
should be located, he replied/ "Maybe, Madrid."
F. SANTIAGO CARRILLO V. THE CPSU
One of the much publicized manifestations of the PCE '
s
evolution to Eurocommunism has been the increasing polemic
between Santiago Carrillo and the CPSU. Having its roots
in the PCE ' s growing independence of mind and its genesis
in the combined factors of the PCE's criticism of the Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the CPSU's moral and
monetary support to Lister's rival PCE, the polemic has
existed at varying levels of intensity for a number of
years
.
The most recent flareup of the conflict (mentioned
earlier in this study) , during which Carrillo was snubbed
by the CPSU by its refusal to allow him to speak before the
delegations to the 6 0th anniversary celebration of the
October Revolution, is actually just a continuation of the
upsurge of the dispute which began in 1974. At that time
the CPSU attacked a report to the PCE Central Committee
Plenum presented by Manuel Azcarate, the party's chief
ideologist and international affairs expert. According
to Mujal-Leon, the CPSU singled out four, aspects of Azcarate's
50
Le Soir , 5 June 1977, pp. 1-3, interview with Santiago
Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE, 14 June 1977, pp. N2-N4.
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report for hard criticism: 1) "his incorrect and absurd
thesis that there were contradictions between the state
interests of the socialist countries and the interests
of the evolutionary movement"/ 2) his invective against the
Soviet socialist system which spread "all manner of lies
about the absences of democracy in the USSR", 3) his out-
look on the problem of autonomy and equality of rights of
the fraternal parties which included "not one ounce of pro-
letarian internationalism" and, 4) his call for a democratic
51
and socialist Europe "which reek(ed) with nationalism".
The events of Portugal in late 1974 and early 1975,
combined with the growing strength of the PCE in the anti-
Franco opposition caused the CPSU to back off from its
critique, but the PCE was not consoled. In June 197 6 at
the East Berlin Conference, Carrillo took the offensive with
vigor, declaring,
For years, Moscow ... was our Rome. We
spoke of the Great October Socialist
Revolution as if it were our Christmas.
That was the period of our infancy. Today
we have grown up. 2
Later, he compared the new resistence to Moscow's domination
to Martin Luther's rejection of Rome. Carrillo 's speech
was characterized as probably the most provocative of the
51Mujal-Leon, p. 51.
52Devlin, "Challenge", p. 1
53
Staar, 1977, p. 227.
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conference. His statements, plus the leading position of
the PCE in opposing Soviet efforts to reassert control
over the events of the conference certainly increased Soviet
enmity toward him. The Madrid Eurocommunist Summit added
fuel to the smoldering fire as the PCE-CPSU conflict rose
to the flash-point. The publication of Carrillo's Euro-
communism and the State in April 1977 provided the spark
for a renewal of Soviet accusations, and the relatively
poor showing of the PCE in the 15 June Spanish elections
provided the opportunity for the attack.
A few days after the election results became official,
the Soviet foreign affairs weekly, Novoye Vremya (New Times)
,
issued a blistering attack on Carrillo and the ideas he put
forth in his book. Claiming that the ideas of Eurocommunism
were intended to aid imperialism, denigrate "real socialism",
strengthen NATO, further the goals of reactionary forces,
and split the international communist movement, the attack
was a veritable "excommunication" of Carrillo. The PCE
responded coolly, expressing surprise at the virulence of
the attack and stating that it was apparently a demonstra-
tion of the Soviet's inability to enter into the process
54
of discussion.
Carrillo quickly mustered the support of his Central
Committee which soon declared that the attack was not just
'Radio Independent Spain, 24 June 1977, as reported in




on Carrillo, but against "all those communist parties which
believe in a democratic way to socialism and for socialism
55in democracy." Later, Carrillo himself responded by
saying that the attack had been received with indignation
by all the members of the party, that the party did not
recognize the power of any Holy Office, that it thereby
rejected its excommunication, and that to continue such
5 6
efforts would be pointless and doomed to failure.
Apparently, the CPSU had miscalculated the reaction of
the other Western communist parties. They came to the aid
of the PCE, although in uneven terms. In early July the
Soviet Union softened its criticism. The situation remained
at a low boil for the next three months only to erupt again
when the CPSU refused Carrillo the previously extended offer
to speak before the rally commemorating the 60th Anniversary
of the October Revolution.
Just prior to departing for Moscow for the rally, Carrillo
spoke to the regional congress of the Basque Communist Party
saying, "Our relations with the CPSU are not broken off,
but they are burdened and affected by the fact that there
is still the lack of readiness with the Soviet comrades to
accept the changes which took place in recent years. Relations
55 Leadership of Spanish Communist Party Rejects Soviet
Union as Model for a Socialist Society" , New York Times ,
27 June 1977, p. 4.
Radio Independent Spain, 28 June 1977, as reported
in FBIS-WE, 29 June 1977, p. N2.
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among communist parties today must be based on readiness
to accept differences in views. These relations can no
longer be based on monolithness and total unity. It
was the Basque Party Congress which prevented Carrillo
from attending the opening session addressed by Brezhnev.
Soon after his arrival, Carrillo learned that he would
not be allowed to speak before the solemn joint session
of the CPSU Central Committee and the Russian Federation
as he had been invited to do earlier. It was a serious
rebuff, but Carrillo made great publicity from the inci-
dent. In explaining why he was barred, Carrillo said, "I
wanted to state the specific conditions of our party,
regardless of the opinions held here (in Moscow) , but that
was not possible. It is their house and they are free to
listen to whom they wish to hear. Time and experience will
5 8tell who is right." It seemed that Carrillo delighted in
his pariah status to such an extent that some observers
suggested he may even have engineered the whole incident
for his own ends. Said one diplomat in Madrid, "The Russians
were booby-trapped. Carrillo came out looking like a stal-
59
wart democrat. Be that as it may, relations between
Carrillo and the CPSU have continued to remain stiffly formal
57
TANJUG , 1 November 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE,
2 November 1977, p. Nl.
58
Kevin Klose, "Carrillo Speech to Soviet Rally Barred",
Washington Post , 4 November 1977, p. 23.
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"Apostle Carrillo", Time, 21 November 1977, p. 47.
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since the incident, while Carrillo has continued to gain
acclaim as Eurocommunism's premier and most notorious
bear-baiter.
G. WHAT IS TO BE GAINED?
In the context of the Madrid Eurocommunist Summit, the
continuing PCE-CPSU conflict, the PCE's self-initiated change
of description at its 9th Party Congress, and continuing,
obvious efforts to be the initiators of change in inter-
national communism, the question arises as to what the PCE
hopes to gain from its maneuverings . The final portion of
this chapter will attempt to provide some answers to that
question.
As was emphasized earlier in this study, the PCE was
an extremely powerful element in the Republic during the
Civil War. From this circumstance two important considera-
tions arise: 1) the party knows by its own experience that
popular front or coalition government tactics can be success-
fully used by a communist party to gain governmental power.
Hence, the PCE today stresses a policy of demanding a
"government of national concentration" in which all important
parties have membership, and 2) the Soviet Union withdrew
its military support from the Republic and thus from the
PCE, at a time when it was crucially needed. In effect,
the CPSU abandoned the PCE when it became evident that Soviet
particular interests were threatened. Hence, the PCE has
a strong basis, albeit late-developing, for its anti-Sovietism,
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Recent events in Spanish politics and PCE/CPSU relations
indicate that these two considerations will continue to
remain important in influencing the course of future events.
At the domestic level, the PCE has been quite successful
at enhancing its popularity. By strongly supporting the
monarchy/ by acting quite responsibly during the 1977 elec-
tion campaign and by being prudent and constructive in its
criticism of the military and police forces, the PCE has
preempted any serious reaction to its existence and public
political activity. In fact, in many ways the PCE has
appeared more patriotic and self-sacrificing than even the
rightist Popular Alliance. The building and securing of
such an image is highly important to the PCE in expanding
its electoral clout in domestic politics.
Eurocommunism provides the PCE with a vehicle for expanding
its influence in domestic politics. Hardly a week goes by
without an interview with Santiago Carrillo appearing in
one of the major weekly news magazines of Spain, and he
is frequently interviewed by the major news magazines of
other West European nations as well. Moreover, hardly a
day goes by without some sort of article concerning the
PCE appearing in the Spanish press. Without the Eurocommunism
issue, Carrillo would be a much less sought-after personality
and the PCE would be just another communist party agitating
to overthrow its government. Carrillo and the PCE have
been quick to take advantage of this free publicity and
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also to use the publications as forums to convey party
views to Spanish voters.
In these media forums the PCE has projected a remarkably
moderate and even-handed image on several important Spanish
political issues. Its conciliatory attitude toward the
monarchy, the police and the military were previously men-
tioned. Its views on Spanish membership in NATO appeal to
the independence of the Spaniard. The PCE proposes the
abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it also
realizes the realities of the existence of these organiza-
tions and would therefore, submit to Spain's membership in
NATO if it were to occur. Meanwhile, the PSOE * s position
opposing Spanish NATO membership is creating friction with
center- right elements of the UDC which it would like to
assimilate. In other matters the PCE has voiced approval
for the Government's economic program (with appropriate
reservations, of course) and has portrayed itself as working
for constructive change in this area. In this matter, also,
the PSOE has become one of the more vocal critics of the
Government program, inspiring additional dissonance among
moderate Socialists and Centrists. In sum, the PCE continues
to work diligently toward enhancing its image as a responsi-
ble, contributing and constructive element of Spanish politics,
whereas the PSOE and other political factions have often
appeared to be indulging in criticism for its own sake. The
PCE apparently hopes to capitalize upon voter dissatisfaction
with these obstructionist tactics to make inroads, particularly
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into PSOE voter strength, to expand its own political
influence.
At the international level, the PCE ' s anti-Sovietism
gives it a unique place among communist parties. By demon-
strating to Western European communist parties in particular
that they have little to fear from the CPSU, the PCE leads
the way in enhancing the acceptance of communist parties
in European politics. By demonstrating to East European
communist parties that the CPSU is not as potent as it pre-
tends, the PCE represents an example that national communism
can be pursued even if it opposes Soviet desires. The
developing models of liberalizing communism of Poland and
Hungary and the Romanian model of prudent independence are
thus encouraged as viable examples of socialist development
growing in the shadow of the Soviet Union. Consequently,
anti-Sovietism has become an important card in the PCE '
s
Eurocommunist deck, and it should be expected that the PCE
under Carrillo's skillful guidance, will continue to play
it as opportunistically as possible in the future.
Three recent events have been instrumental in proving
the viability of PCE views of Eurocommunism and serving
to indicate the future development of Eurocommunism. The
Italian elections of 1976 have become an excellent supportive
example to the PCE's claim that the socialist revolution
can be achieved progressively and peacefully by democratic
means through the development of mass support. The PCI
example has shown that a mass party can be controlled and
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developed to the point of gaining government control in a
pluralistic political system. The process has been quite
slow and deliberate. In 1948 the PCI had 2.1 million members,
but gained 5 million votes, or 23% of the total. By 1976
the PCI ' s membership had actually declined to 1.7 million,
but it garnered over 3 6% of the vote, not to mention the
numerous municipal and regional governmental positions under
60
PCI control. That the PCI could not gain a plurality in
1976 may be attributed in part to lingering doubts among the
Italian electorate as to the veracity of Eurocommunist pro-
nouncements. Therefore, following the PCE theory, PCI
renunciation of the CPSU model could allay Italian fears
and put the PCI "over the top" and into control of the
government.
The French elections of 1978 can be viewed as sustaining
the PCE ' s anti-Soviet view, also, while providing additional
proof that the popular front tactic must be maintained until
power is achieved. Subsequent to the 1972 Communist-Socialist
Union of the Left with its Common Program, the PCF gained in
party membership and percentage of the vote attained so that
the 1974 elections portended the French Left's gaining the
Presidency and hence, the PCF becoming extremely influential





Soviet Ambassador Tchervonenko ' s well-publicized pre-election
call on candidate Valery Giscard d'Estaing seemed to indi-
cate Soviet support of him against Socialist candidate
Francois Mitterrand. As Giscard subsequently won by only
1.4% of the vote, the PCF had good reason to be highly dis-
turbed by the Soviet interference. Later, in 1977, Brezhnev
himself visited France. Courting Giscard and Gaullist leader
Jacques Chirac, but not Marchais, Brezhnev seemed to be
confirming that the Soviets still regarded the Giscard govern-
6 2
ment as a priviledged Soviet ally in the Western camp.
Moreover, rather than take advantage of the slight to renounce
Soviet influence, the PCF renounced the Common Program in-
stead. The public lost faith in the veracity of the PCF '
s
conciliatory posture, and the Left lost the elections of
March 1978. In fact, the Center actually gained additional
seats in the Chamber. The PCE approach was, by contrast,
proven correct once again. Hence, it should be expected
that the PCE will continue to call for its own "government
of national concentration" to increase its importance in
Spanish politics.
As mentioned, the PCE voted at its 9th Party Congress
to drop the term "Leninist" from its description, describing
itself as "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary" rather
"TSoldsborough, p. 802.
62




than using the "Marxist - Leninist" description which it
formerly shared with all other communist parties. This
event has added a new dimension to the ideas of Eurocommunism,
Carrillo described the reasoning behind the change:
In practice for some years the Communist
Party has left behind a whole range of
Leninist concepts and this, which some
party members consider a wrench, is merely
being consistent with what we have done in
the past... I would say that we are more
faithful to Lenin's attitude toward the
problems of his time than those who retain
the definition of Marxism-Leninism, because
one of the original aspects of Lenin's
attitude was the open break with a number
of Marxist theses which he considered out-
dated by his time and did not hesitate to
leave aside in order to accelerate society's
transformation in Russia . . . That is why
we are more faithful to Lenin's creative and
innovative spirit than others. 63
Although declining to abandon all of Lenin's ideas (only
Lenin's name and a number of "outdated" teachings were
dropped) , the PCE nonetheless has made a radical new move
to deemphasize the relevance of the Soviet model as the
guiding light of world communist parties. This move repre-
sents a serious challenge to orthodox communists and an
attempt by the PCE to enhance its position as the model for
independent national communists. The repercussions of this
move by the PCE, although not immediately felt, should prove
to be far-reaching and serve to accelerate the further dis-
aggregation of the international communist movement.
63 Cambio 16 , 2 April 1978, p. 14-17, interview with




In answer to the question, what is to be gained, which
was posed at the beginning of this section, it is clear that
Carrillo hopes to gain the voters of Spain. Only by con-
tinuing to enhance its democratic image, to renounce its
conspiratorial heritage, and to demonstrate its vitality
in domestic politics can the PCE make inroads into PSOE
domination of the left. Only by demonstrating that Euro-
communism is a viable and effective alternative to violent
revolutionary tactics for the attainment of socialism can
the PCE pacify the radical left and gain international
support. Carrillo seems to believe that Eurocommunism pro-




V. THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS MODEL
If there are truly "many roads to socialism" as the
Eurocommunists claim, then certainly the Spanish road is
the narrowest and most fraught with possible pitfalls. The
next few years will be crucial ones to the very existence
of the PCE in its present form in Spain. This chapter will
examine the levels of analysis model as a useful and appro-
priate tool to understand political developments within the
PCE, within Spanish politics and within the Eurocommunist-
CPSU relationship. Armed with this understanding, conclu-
sions can be reached as to the probable future course of
events in each of these three arenas.
The first section of this chapter will describe the
levels of analysis model, expanding upon the brief descrip-
tion presented in the introduction of this study. Following
sections will present various elements at each level and
attempt to show the interaction of those elements within
the levels, as well as between the levels. In this way
the various elements (events, characteristics, perceptions)
presented in the preceding chapters of this study may be
integrated to analyze past activities of the PCE and, hope-
fully, to predict future activities.
The operation of the model can be likened to that of a
three-dimensional chess game in that, just as the movement
of a piece at any level of play effects the play at all
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levels, a change at any level of political relationships
effects the situation at all levels. Consequently, when an
event is analyzed for its effect on the situation at the
level in which it occurs, it must also be analyzed for its
effect at the other levels as well. Moreover, the analysis
is complicated by the fact that different events may occur
at all levels simultaneously, thus increasing the unpre-
dictability of the results of the interaction. The following
figure shows the model schematically.




Unfortunately, no observer can have full knowledge of
how an event will interact with other elements at the level
where it occurs nor how it will interact within the elements
of the other levels. However, by knowing and having a good
understanding of the character of the major "effectors" at
each level, an observer can attach some sort of probability
to the possible outputs. Indeed, a major aim of political
science today is to reduce the subjectivity of the assigned
probabilities so as to predict outcomes with greater certainty.
Use of the levels of analysis model allows for the inclusion
of quantitative indices as well as subjective characteriza-
tion so as to view the elements in better perspective. Con-
sequently, the indices take on more meaning and enhance
the reliability of the predictive output of the model.
A. FIRST LEVEL - INTRAPARTY INTERACTION
Looking to the first level, several factors can be found
which effect intra-party politics and lend a certain character
to the outputs from this level. One factor is the nature
of the leadership of the party. As indicated in earlier
section concerning the PCE leadership, it is very personalized,
centralized and growing older. It is, nonetheless, still
very strong and very much in control of the party. Conse-
quently, PCE policy will likely remain into the near future
very much as it is today.
Another factor which lends itself to the PCE ideal of
discipline and respect for authority is the composition of
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its membership. Being largely a working-class organization,
the membership is somewhat oriented toward following instruc-
tions, even to the point of following orders that lead to
no readily apparent goal. The relatively small number of
students and intellectuals reduces the possibility of serious
dissent within the party ranks. Added to this is the factor
of the quasi-religious nature and family tradition of PCE
membership. Most communists are convinced of the righteous-
ness of their ideals and cling to them tenaciously, even
when confronted with obvious discrepancies in logic, much
as deeply religious church goers maintain their convictions
despite theological inconsistencies. In addition, communism
in Spain seems to be something of a family affair, in some
cases with all members of a family being believers, a tra-
dition which sometimes extends to second and even third
generations. Consequently, when a party line is announced,
the first, and possibly only, inclination of most of the
membership is to fall docilely into line.
A look at the PCE ' s recent change of description will
demonstrate how the elements presented above interacted to
enable the change to take place and will provide an estimate
of what can be expected in the near future. In the first
instance, the whole evolution of the PCE under Carrillo has
seemingly pointed to this change. Many of the ideals of
Mclnnes, "Communist Parties", p. 62.
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Marxism-Leninism and Marxist Social-Democracy are shared.
The Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism is being increasingly
discredited and denounced by even its own adherents. The
practicality of using the democratic process for attaining
power is being increasingly accepted. (Perhaps even Carrillo's
own Socialist youth and parentage has had an effect here.)
At any rate, a very astute observer might have suspected
some change in the offing from analysis of Carrillo's comment
at the press conference at which Eurocommunism and the State
was first publicly presented.
The PCE's attitude does not blaspheme against
Leninism, although it is possible that in
the future I may be described as a renegade
against Lenin.
'
The pending change in ideology was given further clarifica-
tion by Manuel Azcarate in a later interview:
We Spanish Communists discarded the term
Marxism-Leninism eight years ago. We felt
long ago that many aspects of Leninism were
outdated. The dictatorship of the proletariat,
Lenin's conception of democracy, the setup of
the cadre party and the idea that the revolu-
tion of the world would take place as a
world-wide civil war -- all of this is no
longer acceptable.
3
Consequently, given the internal characteristics previously
discussed, once Carrillo decided upon the change, gaining
party approval was not difficult. Carrillo's fall over the
2La Vanguadia , 26 May 1977, p. 11, as reported in
FBIS-WE, 31 May 1977, p. Nl
.
Per Spiegel , 12 December 1977, pp. 130-132, as reported
in FBIS-WE, 14 December, 1977, p. N2.
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policy change/ although broached by some observers, was
highly improbable. Had he not survived worse threats in
the 1960" s? Had he not stood eyeball-to-eyeball with the
Soviets on a number of occasions in recent years and forced
them to blink on each occasion? Therefore, despite the
ironic position of the Catalan PSUC ' s both supporting the
4
change and opposing the change at the same time, the PCE
will henceforth be a "Marxist, democratic, revolutionary"
party, with little or no subsequent criticism of Carrillo.
It should be expected that the PSUC will clarify its posi-
tion to conform to the PCE stance. It should also be
expected that the PCE ' s evolution away from democratic
centralism will continue, but at the slow pace desired by
Carrillo. That Carrillo is satisfied with the present
state of events is indicated in his reply to a question
of how democratic he believes the PCE ' s internal organiza-
tion to be:
I believe that it is perfectly democratic.
I do not think that there is any party whose
groups meet and discuss as frequently as the
PCE's. I know that there are those who
4On 8 April 1977 the PSUC Central Committee voted 97 to
87 to abolish the term "Leninism" with 6 abstentions. This
vote was taken on the basis that the Central Committee
should vote in bloc. On 9 April 1977 the conference decided
the Central Committee should vote in accordance with their
personal convictions. The decision resulted in 97 votes to
retain the term to 81 against with 7 abstentions.
5
"Democracy v. Authority", p. 32.
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reproach our system of democratic cen-
tralism as not being sufficiently demo-
cratic. All the parties in Spain today,
however, are undoubtedly ruled by cen-
tralism which is often just centralism and
not democratic centralism. They are cen-
tralists wihtout being aware of it. The
difference is that our centralism is demo-
cratic and our party's militants discuss,
hold meetings and give expression to their
opinions with full freedom.
^
B. SECOND LEVEL - DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTERACTION
Looking to the second level, a number of inter-related
factors are found which complicate the PCE aim to gain more
influence in the domestic political scene. The June 1977
elections showed quite vividly that the PCE, with just
over 9% of the vote is, after all, a small party. Moreover,
even if the figure of 300,000 members is accepted, the entire
PCE membership amounts to less than 2% of the total vote
returned. Consequently, in order to exert a noticeable
influence, the PCE must continue with its moderate program
promulgated in the Pact for Liberty. The pitfalls of main-
taining such moderate views is that they may easily be usurped
by other parties. For example, the PCE has long pressed
for regional autonomy. However, through the Platajunta,
the PSOE was able to assimilate that issue as it it were
solely its own. Then, after the elections, when the Suarez
government moved to grant autonomy to Catalonia, Galicia
c.
Madrid Domestic Service reportage of undated Alfonso
Diez interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in




and the Basque provinces, the PCE was able to claim only
a small part of the credit for the accomplishment.
Much the same occurred with the issue of free trade
unions. Here again, the PSOE was able to proclaim its
support of trade union freedom. This came to pass on 8
April 1977 when the Government legalized the existence of
the major unions (the Communist Workers Commissions (CCOO)
,
the Socialist General Workers* Union (UGT) , the Independent
Socialist Workers' Labor Union (USO) , the United Catalan
Workers (SOC) and the United Basque Workers) . Similarly,
the close proximity in the political spectrum of the PSOE
and the PCE on a number of other vital issues, provides the
PSOE with an ominous ability to subsume PCE platform planks
into its own platform, or at least to embrace them as part
of the popular front program, thereby weakening the PCE
in any political campaign.
Analysis of the implications posed by the election results
and the consolidation efforts of the PSOE and UCD present
some related problems for PCE expansion. Much of PCE voting
strength was concentrated in northern industrial areas.
Additionally, nearly one-half of the PCE deputies in the
Cortes are members of the Catalonian affiliate, the PSUC.
If, in the context of a popular front, the PSUC felt that
it could make greater gains through closer relations with
the PSOE, the PSUC might desire to "de-affiliate" itself
from the PCE. Such a turn of events is not likely, but if
it were to happen, the prospects for the PCE would be disastrous
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For much the same reason/ irritated leftist factions of
the PCE might feel "sold-out" by the party's generally
moderate stance and splinter off to join existing radical,
leftist parties. Again, the prospects for the PCE would
be disquieting, to say the least. Therefore the dilemma
for the PCE within a popular front is that the party is too
small at present to stand by itself and gain any power, but
to move to the right opens grave possibilities of being
subsumed by the larger PSOE, while to move to the left
reopens the specter of the PCE ' s Civil War legacy and its
years of Soviet association while in exile.
Therefore, though the PCE has had some success in
ameliorating public images of its past, it will continue
to have to deal with that legacy for some time to come.
Spaniards have long memories, and many Spanish voters today
had relatives or lovers who were liquidated by the Communist-
controlled Republican government. Consequently, accusations
about Civil War atrocities allegedly performed by a PCE
candidate could quickly dispel weeks or months of campaign
gains. Just such a tactic was used against Carrillo himself
several times during the 1977 campaign, and it undoubtedly
cost him votes. Therefore, unlike most other communist
parties of Europe, the PCE must make great efforts to stay
on the "straight and narrow". Any slip could conjure up the




Ironically/ public exposure and media publicity have
also had some beneficial effect on the PCE's popularity.
In fact/ some observers have noted that the plethora of
newspaper and magazine articles, interviews and commentary
concerning the uniqueness of the PCE struggle for legaliza-
tion and recognition have inflated the importance of the
party all out of proportion to its actual political
strength. So far the party has done well at capitalizing
upon its supposed novelty, to publicize its program and
to advertize its own virtues. As time passes and the PCE
loses the luster of this "newness", it will be forced to
devise other measures to keep itself in the public eye. One
way is to become an outspoken proponent of Eurocommunism,
as will be discussed later.
Another of the ways the PCE can maintain its uniqueness
and thus its public exposure is through vocal opposition to
the CPSU. Posing as an outspoken, maverick opponent of
Soviet-style communism not only gets the PCE into the news
limelight, it also serves to dispell aspects of its histori-
cal legacy that associate the PCE with Soviet hegemonic
intentions. Thus, "A vote for communism is a vote for
democracy" became the slogan of the PCE's first legal Central
7Committee meeting on April 15, 1977. Later in the month,
7Madrid Radio, 14 April 1977, as reported m FBIS-WE,




Carrillo said in an interview, "I mistrust the Russians as
much as you do. I am a Spaniard, not a Russian. We want
gdemocratic socialism, not Stalinism." In another inter-
view he stated, "The state we want for Spain would bear
very little resemblance to the state which exists in the
Soviet Union because we want a democratic, multiparty state
with universal suffrage and with the possibility for changes
9in the government." The obvious intent in all three cases
was to enhance the nationalistic appeal of the party and
to dispel as much as possible any inferences of control by
an outside power.
Therefore, analysis of the elements of the second level
indicates that the PCE seems to be gaining some of its much
sought-after respectibility, and that even though it is
still small in membership and commands less than 10% of the
Spanish vote, it yet has room to maneuver within the solidi-
fying amalgam of Spanish politics. However, in order to
add to its appeal for Spanish voters, the PCE needs a source
of prestige from outside Spanish politics. Consequently,
not only is the PCE moving in domestic politics to try to
allay suspicions that it is controlled by the CPSU, it is
also moving through the espousal of Eurocommunism to
o
C.L. Sulzberger, "Problems of Ghost Laying," New York
Times , 23 April 1977, p. 19.
9 Interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE,




publicize its independence in the international communist
movement as well.
C. THIRD LEVEL - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INTERACTION
At the third level of analysis, the PCE is plagued by
problems very similar to the ones it encounters at the
domestic level. The first problem, again, is its small
size. Not only does it comprise less than 2% of the Spanish
electorate, its membership comprises only 4% of the total
for West European communist parties. Therefore, without
an issue, it is of little consequence in the international
communist movement. Eurocommunism has provided the issue
by which the PCE has become internationally important.
Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State is being touted as a
sort of "New Testament" of communism, and Carrillo himself
delights in the image of the PCE playing David to the Soviet
Union's Goliath. Similarly, Carrillo has attempted to use
the Eurocommunist Summit as an outward expression of the
support which the PCI and PCF ostensibly give him as a
guiding light in the Eurocommunist movement. In sum, Carrillo
seems to be trying to use Eurocommunism as a sort of popular
front against the hegemonic intentions of the Soviet Union
and a method by which the small but vocal PCE can exert
great influence on the policies of a much larger coalition
of West European communists.
However, here again, Carrillo is faced with the prospect
that either of the other parties contending for Eurocommunist
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leadership, the PCI or the PCF, or other divisive interests
of the parties will drastically curtail the PCE's importance.
In the first case, the PCI, as the largest communist party
in Western Europe and the one closest to gaining governing
power, conceivably would like to be considered as the leader
of the Eurocommunists and therefore displace the PCE's
leadership pretentions. In the second case, the PCF and
other European communist parties do not totally agree upon
just how independent of Moscow it is prudent for the Euro-
communists to be. Therefore, they could easily withdraw
their support of the PCE and, again, displace the PCE's
leadership pretentions.
The PCE also has an international legacy to overcome
and that is its strong Stalinist image despite its increasing
anti-Soviet stance since 1968. There is no question that
Carrillo runs the PCE with an iron hand and that democratic
centralism, despite appearances, is alive and well in the
PCE. Indeed the extent to which democratic centralism pre-
vails is a major observation made by PCE critics. Moreover,
the long years that the party machine existed in Moscow under
the wing of the CPSU leaves lingering doubts in the minds
of would-be Eurocommunists that the PCE is truly as independent
of the Soviet line as it claims to be. European communists
Flora Lewis, "Italian Reds Seek Europe-wide Alliance
of Leftist Parties," New York Times, 1 December 1977, p. 10.
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know very well that it is quite possible for party policy
to change overnight, especially in a tightly controlled
party like the PCE . Consequently, the sincerity of the
PCE ' s anti-Sovietism remains in some question.
Finally, in taking its anti-Soviet stance, the PCE has
elected to take on a formidable foe. The CPSU has tremen-
dous political resources at its disposal to use in pressing
other communist parties to oppose the PCE and the Euro-
communists. Failing that, just levering some parties into
a non- supportive stance would be sufficient to dim the
luster of Eurocommunism, create doubts as to the sagacity
of vocal anti-Sovietism and severely undermine the prestige
of the PCE. This is one reason why Carrillo eagerly courts
the favor of the PCI, PCF and even Eastern European communist
parties such as those of Romania and Yugoslavia. Moreover,
Soviet resources can be used to support anti-Carrillo ele-
ments in the PCE to lever an amelioration of PCE policy or
even to try to oust Carrillo.
The possible success of the PCE poses additional compli-
cations for the CPSU as it continues to try to reassert its
authority in international communist relations. After
forty years, the PCE has cropped up again to pose the threat
of a markedly different model of communism which challenges
the Soviet model on a number of decisive points. And the
new model is developing in a country where the most powerful
support of the Soviet model, the Soviet Army, has no sway.
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It can be expected that the CPSU will use every other means
at its disposal to rid itself of the PCE threat. Conse-
quently, the PCE is playing a very serious and dangerous
game in opposing the concept of proletarian internationalism,
defined as the Soviet domination of the international
communist movement.
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
factors of the three levels of analysis are not independent.
Instead, they are quite interdependent. This interdependence
has been alluded to in the discussion of the individual
levels presented above, however, a more specific example
will illustrate the concept further.
The PCE, being a small party, obviously desires to
increase its membership. Since its moderate domestic poli-
cies are liable to appropriation by political elements to
its right and may cause severe internal disaffection within
the party, the PCE needs to project an internationalist
image in order to enhance the importance of its total pro-
gram and to maintain party unity. It thereby maintains and
controls its present membership while using its international
luster to attract additional adherents. It logically follows
that as the party grows and becomes a more important domestic
political entity in an emerging European power such as
Spain, the party's international importance also increases,
and the process continually renews itself.
However, the spiral to success can easily become a
spiral to failure. A poor showing in future Spanish elections
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could weaken Carrillo's control, exacerbate internal PCE
tensions and render it a less potent domestic political
force, thereby reducing its importance as a proponent of
Eurocommunism. If, in addition, the PCE should subsequently
react to domestic political pressure by shifting party
policy to the left, its prestige as a supporter of Euro-
communist ideals would suffer further. As PCE retrenchment
reflects unfavorably on the PCI and PCF, they may tend to
reduce their support. Lack of international communist
support, then, might enable Soviet pressures, acting upon
internal party disputes, to become more effective and further
hinder the PCE ' s ability to act effectively in domestic
politics. The whole process could lead to an entire change




The great advantage of using the levels of analysis
model as a reference for viewing political entities such
as the PCE is that it provides a framework for developing
an understanding of the interactions between and within each
level of political relationships. Consequently, the model
can be extremely useful in helping not only to identify
phenomena and trends, but also to attach subjective proba-
bilities as to the significance of those phenomena or trends
and to determine where they may lead.
Using the model, several phenomena have been identified
at the internal party level which will have some bearing on
future events. The first conclusion is that the Pact for
Liberty, i.e. the "bourgeoisification" of the PCE, will be
continued to be pursued. The PCE can be expected to consoli-
date its worker-based strength in the northern industrial
areas and continue to attempt to recruit students, intellect-
uals and other middle-class elements. Meanwhile, inten-
sified efforts will be expended to expand the limited PCE
influence among the working-class elements of the southern
areas. As industries continue to grow around the cities of
the South identified as "industrial poles" in the development
program begun by Franco, the opportunities for expanded PCE
presence in the South are improved.
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A second conclusion is that PCE membership will continue
to expand and increase. A number of PCE policy positions
are progressive enough to entice certain middle-class and
agricultural elements to the party and are realistic enough
to be achieved/ thus enhancing the PCE ' s image as an effec-
tive political entity and which will ultimately result in
further increasing PCE membership. The increased PCE
recruitment effort cited above certainly adds to the proba-
bility of this outcome.
The trends noted in the discussion above interact with
a number of developing trends at the national political
level to indicate the great possibility of increased PCE
vote totals in coming elections. First, it appears that
the PCE's moderate stance has vitiated its Civil War legacy
to some degree. Its moderate stance is also enabling the
PCE increasingly to become a viable alternative to the PSOE
among Spanish voters and certainly to the radical left.
Secondly, it is highly probable that Carrillo was at least
partially correct in his assessment of the June 1977 election
results when he stated that he thought many voters, fearing
some sort of reprisals or being confused by all the choices,
opted to vote for the PSOE as the only "safe" leftist vote.
Consequently, as it becomes more firmly evident that
Radio Independent Spain reportage of Carrillo reaction
to election results, 17 June 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE,




Franco-era repression has truly disappeared, it is probable
that the next Spanish elections will show the PCE receiving
a larger percentage of the left vote.
Thirdly, the PSOE, despite its reunification with the
PSP, has not as yet fully developed into a cohesive politi-
cal opposition to the Government. Gonzalez' apparently
tentative attempts to move the party more to the center and
a Social-Democratic orientation may re-introduce a splinter
of the more Marxist elements led by the PSP. This outcome,
when viewed in the light of the PCE * s move away from Leninism,
makes the possibility of a PCE-PSP political union far from
remote. Consequently, prospects for the PSOE ' s losing in
voting percentages from its June totals are, for a number
of reasons, quite probable, as are the prospects for the
PCE ' s gaining votes in the center-left.
Finally the UCD appears to be coalescing very nicely
under the dynamic personality of Suarez and becoming well
aware of the political advantages of unity and incumbancy.
The UCD's political effectiveness and enhanced organizational
ability will probably result in its gaining additional
support from both its right and from regional parties of
the center-left. Therefore, the UCD should maintain or
even expand its plurality and governmental control.
The ultimate prospect is that a political spectrum may
develop in Spain similar to that existing in France, where
the Communists and the Socialists comprise a governmental
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opposition (albeit at the moment not unified) very nearly
equal to the center-right majority. It would also be very
similar in the respect that the Socialists would be only a
slightly larger party than the Communists. Time will tell
if developing international trends could provide an impetus
to further change this prospective Spanish correlation of
political forces into a political spectrum similar to the
Italian case, where the Communists are the dominant party
of the opposition.
Such a prospect is enhanced by the fact that each Latin
Eurocommunist party is being increasingly viewed as a viable
governmental participant. A recent article in Foreign Affairs
illustrates this point. In it, Ugo La Malfa, President of
the small Italian Republican Party and long-time anti-communist,
lends his support to a coalition government to include the
2
PCI. Such changes of political heart add greatly to the
probability that the PCI will enter the Italian government
in the near future. In addition, even though the Union of
the Left in France is dormant at the moment, the French Left
remains a potent political force. Therefore, the revival
of the Common Program remains possible, as does the possi-
bility of PCF participation in a leftist government in France.
If, and some would say when, such events occur, the PCE will
2Ugo La Malfa, "Communism and Democracy in Italy",
Foreign Affairs , April 1977, pp. 476-488.
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be the most likely beneficiary of Eurocommunism's heightened
importance. A "government of national concentration"
resulting from a political union of the Spanish left would,
as a consequence, be given a significant boost. At the
moment the prospects for a "Union de la Izquierda" in the
French manner are small, due largely to PSOE resistance to
the idea. Consequently, the political spectrum in Spain
will stabilize in a three-way struggle between the PCE and
PSOE on the left and the UCD on the right.
To the above considerations should be added the continuing
maturation of Eurocommunist ideology as a new model for
reform-minded regimes in Eastern Europe. Little has been
mentioned in this work concerning the Eurocommunist challenge
to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The reader is referred
to the numerous recently published works addressing the
problem, some of which are noted in the bibliography of
3this work. Jin Valenta makes the following point concerning
this trend:
Indeed, since the East Berlin Conference,
the relationship between the Eurocommunist
s
in Western Europe and the refo rmist and
dissident circles in Eastern Europe seems
more and more to have become one of mutual
reinforcement. 4
See Coe, Devlin, Gati , Goldsborough, Helms, Mclnnes,
and Valenta for the most extensive discussions of the
topic.
4Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe",
Problems of Communism, March/April 1978, p. 47.
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A major effect of this phenomenon is to enhance the PCE
image of no longer being under Soviet control or even
influence. Such an image can only improve the PCE '
s
domestic political standing vis-a-vis the other elements
of the Spanish left.
Another consideration is the not readily apparent,
but logically imputed, growing Soviet irritation with the
likes of Santiago Carrillo and his revisionist ideas.
Although Carrillo claims that the PCE does not desire to
break with the CPSU, the CPSU has already made preliminary
attempts to "excommunicate" Carrillo. As he continues to
"de-Leninize" the PCE, and as he continues to espouse autono-
mist ideas and cajole the other West European parties
toward a similar bent, the probability that the PCE will
break with the CPSU is becoming greater.
The overall conclusion resulting from the above analysis
is that the PCE is not merely a fleeting antithesis in the
dialectic of international communism. Rather, it is a
firmly established force of growing importance in Spanish
politics as well as international communist relations, which
will remain so into the future. Therefore, U.S. observers
of Spanish politics and international communist relations
should take cognizance of this reality and give it due consid-
eration when deliberating American foreign policy measures.
5Radio Independent Spam, 28 June 1978, Carrillo press
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